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OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS: EMOTION, 
COMMITMENT, AND IMAGINATION IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
Doni Gewirtzman * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the dawn of the American republic, constitutional law 
and theory have treated emotion as destructive to the creation 
and maintenance of constitutional commitments. If a constitu-
tion's purpose is to advance rule-of-law values like stability, con-
sistency, and predictability over time and across generations,1 
emotion-viewed as an unstable, inconsistent, and unpredictable 
force-threatens these values, thereby undermining the legitima-
cy and vitality of constitutional commitments and institutions. 
Thus, the argument goes, emotion should have as little to do with 
constitutional lawmaking and interpretation as possible.2 
This dominant account of the relationship between emotion 
and constitutional law informed core features of American consti-
tutional design and practice. The framers saw rationality and 
reason as essential elements of sound public decision making, and 
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., 1993, Weslyan Univ.; J.D., 
1998, Univ. of California-Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law. 
I am deeply thankful for the input I received from among others, Sam Bagenstos, 
Mark Brandon, Rebecca Brown, Elizabeth Chambliss, Oscar Chase, Anne Coughlin, Peggy 
Cooper Davis, Steve Ellmann, John Goldberg, Chris Guthrie, Helen Hershkoff, Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff, Owen Jones, Terry Maroney, Nadine Strossen, Kenji Yoshino, and the 
members of the New York Law School Junior Faculty Colloquium, and the editors at the 
University of Richmond Law Review. 
1. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2831 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical 
document that would transmit its basic values to future generations through principles 
that remained workable over time."); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extra-
judicial Constitutional Interpretation, llO HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1372-81 (1997). 
2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of 
Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069-71 (2006) (describing the 
"false allure of formalism" in constitutional judging, which claims that the judges' views, 
ideologies, and experiences do not affect their decisions). 
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selected deliberative decision-making structures that maximized 
opportunities for legislators to explain and test their underlying 
reasoning. For example, Article I's bicameralism and present-
ment requirements, which mandate that proposed legislation 
gain approval from multiple decision makers representing vastly 
different constituencies,3 use the cold and slow realities of consti-
tutional procedure to slow the hot impulse of emotion. The 
amendment process-a lengthy procedure that generally requires 
assent from supermajorities of federal and state representa-
tives4-was also insulated from the whims of popular passion. 
And judges, trained in legal methodologies that recognized the 
primacy of reason and the need for consistency, came to be seen 
as the sole and final arbiters of constitutional meaning. 
This "Chinese wall" characterization of the relationship be-
tween emotion and constitutional law5 has had remarkable stay-
ing power. And under the influence of its spell, contemporary 
constitutional scholarship contains only a very limited discussion 
about how emotion actually works or impacts public decision 
making.6 Unlike their counterparts in the criminal law arena, 7 
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 2-3, 7. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
5. See THE ECONOMIST, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS 58 (Graham Bannock et al. eds., 
2003). 
6. For examples of how constitutional scholars address social- and natural-science 
research on emotions, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Im-
plications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2008) (discussing emotional influence in informed-consent abortion laws); Chris Guthrie, 
Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 So. CAL. L. REV. 877 
(2008); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergen-
cies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 626-35 (2003) (exploring how fear impacts decision making in 
an emergency context); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Ex-
tremes, llO YALE L.J. 71, 74--75 (2000) (investigating how social influences on behavior 
and limited "argument pools" cause deliberative bodies to decide in accordance with their 
members' "predeliberation tendencies"). Constitutional theorists are not alone in neglect-
ing how emotions actually work. See G.E. Marcus, Emotions in Politics, 3 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 221, 221 (2000) [hereinafter Marcus, Emotions in Politics] (referencing "the dominant 
view in political theory that progress and democratic politics require less emotion and 
more reason"). For large segments of the twentieth century, economics, psychology, and 
political science were dominated by rational-actor, cognition-based explanations for hu-
man behavior. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 1-4 (1990) (describing the "cogni-
tive revolution" in psychology); Donald R. Kinder, Reason and Emotion in Political Life, in 
BELIEFS, REASONING, AND DECISION MAKING 277, 278 (Roger C. Schank & Ellen Langer 
eds., 1994) (critiquing the lack of exploration of emotion in political science); George Loe-
wenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Effect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF 
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 619 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); George E. Marcus, 
Emotions and Politics: Hot Cognitions and the Rediscovery of Passion, 30 Soc. SCI. INFO. 
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constitutional theorists have for the most part been content to re-
ly on a set of broad generalizations about human behavior.8 As a 
result, constitutional theory has largely ignored a voluminous 
body of empirical and theoretical literature about emotion that 
has accumulated over the past twenty years.9 Meanwhile, social 
scientists in a range of disciplines-social psychology,10 neurobi-
ology,11 philosophy,12 political science,13 sociology,14 and econom-
icsl5-have created a much richer and more nuanced account of 
how emotion affects the way individuals interpret the world 
around them, determines preferences and attitudes, and helps 
make decisions. This new research threatens to turn long-held 
assumptions about emotion and human behavior on their collec-
tive head. 
This article explores the potential implications of this research 
for constitutional law and theory. It concludes that emotion (1) 
critically affects two behaviors that are central to the continued 
legitimacy and survival of constitutional values and institutions: 
commitment and imagination; (2) enhances individuals' ability to 
maintain commitments over time by reinforcing habits, acting as 
a stabilizing force for popular attitudes within a large and hete-
195, 196 (1991) [hereinafter Marcus, Emotions and Politics]. 
7. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of 
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional 
Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1375, 1375-76 (2006). 
8. See RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST 
MANIFESTO 88-93 (1994). 
9. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE xi (1995) (describing "an unpa-
ralleled burst of scientific studies of emotion" in recent years). 
10. See, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); JONATHAN HAIDT, 
THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006). 
11. See, e.g., ANTONIO D. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS 
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996). 
12. See, e.g., CHERYL HALL, THE TROUBLE WITH PASSION: POLITICAL THEORY BEYOND 
THE REIGN OF REASON 11-20 (2005). 
13. See, e.g., TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: How EMOTIONAL 
APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK (2006); GEORGE E. MARCUS, THE SENTIMENTAL CITIZEN: 
EMOTION IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2002); DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE 
ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007). 
14. See, e.g., PASSIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Jeff Goodwin 
et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter PASSIONATE POLITICS]. 
15. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF 
THE EMOTIONS (1988); Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryov-
er Effects of Emotions on Economic Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 337 (2004). 
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rogeneous polity, and helping individuals interpret and prioritize 
constitutional commitments; and (3) makes imagination possible, 
allowing constitutional communities to reassess and revise prior 
commitments. 
Each conclusion runs contrary to standard accounts of emotion 
as a destabilizing and destructive force in constitutional law. This 
article is an effort to rectify that situation and to create a closer 
link between constitutional theory and the social practice of con-
stitutionalism. 
In turn, these social practices can potentially alter a range of 
ongoing debates within constitutional theory. An enhanced rec-
ognition of emotion's positive impact on constitutional culture 
calls into question the Supreme Court of the United States' status 
as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning, certain assump-
tions about the Court's ability to impact public opinion, the ap-
propriate standards for constitutional amendment, and the de-
sign of democratic institutions. 
Part II of this article argues that the Constitution's drafters 
subscribed to a theory of human behavior that is embedded 
throughout American constitutional structure and practice. The 
theory consisted of two widely accepted propositions that still en-
joy widespread acceptance in contemporary constitutional cul-
ture: (1) a rigid dualism that sets reason and emotion in irrecon-
cilable opposition to one another and (2) a strong preference for 
rational, deliberate decision making over making choices based 
on feelings or intuition. This theory guided core aspects of consti-
tutional design and has been perpetuated by subsequent genera-
tions of constitutional judges, lawyers, and scholars. 
Parts III and IV challenge the notion that emotion represents a 
threat to the constitutional order. Part III uses research in the 
social and natural sciences to argue that emotion helps individu-
als keep and maintain commitments. This, in turn, enables a 
large and heterogeneous polity to operate in stable and predicta-
ble ways, and allows constitutional commitments to transcend 
generational and demographic shifts. Moreover, emotion helps 
structure the process of interpreting existing commitments and 
integrally contributes to the exercise of rational thought. Part IV 
argues that emotion enables the imagination to conceive of new 
commitments, and therefore is essential to the process of consti-
tutional revision and renewal. In particular, emotion informs per-
2009] OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS 627 
ceptions of existing commitments, enables people to assess ra-
tionally their continued value, and facilitates action to change 
those commitments when necessary. 
Finally, Part V spells out some preliminary ideas about how 
emotion research might advance current descriptive and norma-
tive debates in constitutional theory. 
Given the wide scope of recent emotion research and its many 
potential implications, there are two limitations on the scope of 
this article. First, it does not directly address the growing body of 
literature on judicial behavior.16 While much of the work on emo-
tion and decision making has potential implications for how 
judges interpret the Constitution, judicial actors are not the focus 
of this piece. Rather, it primarily focuses on how citizens develop 
their own interpretations of constitutional meaning, because pop-
ular conceptions of constitutional law-in the form of public opi-
nion-often act as a constraint on the Court's power.17 Constitu-
tional meaning stems from a cultural interplay between law and 
politics, and it is impossible to understand fully doctrinal devel-
opment by focusing exclusively on the actions of federal judges. If, 
as many political scientists and constitutional scholars have con-
cluded, the Supreme Court operates within constraints estab-
lished by dominant electoral majorities,18 the forces that govern 
individuals' political perceptions and behavior are a powerful and 
highly relevant dynamic in contemporary constitutional lawmak-
mg. 
Second, the relationship between law and emotion works in 
both directions. As emotion shapes the content and interpretation 
of legal commitments, the law also shapes emotional responses in 
16. See generally Richard A. Posner, How JUDGES THINK (2008); Chris Guthrie, Jeff· 
rey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrick, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?" The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
17. See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics 
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 511, 528-32 (2007) (summarizing 
recent legal literature supporting the link between public opinion and the Court's decision 
making). 
18. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (2001) (addressing the effect of the Republican party's 
entrenchment on the Court's decision regarding the 2000 presidential election); Robert A. 
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 
J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). 
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both legal and non-legal contexts. By defining the spheres of pub-
lic and private conduct, the appropriate uses of the state's coer-
cive power, and the areas of individual autonomy, constitutional 
law cultivates and manipulates emotional response. While this 
topic deserves further exploration, it is beyond the limited scope 
of this article. 
A Note About the Definition of Emotion 
"Emotion" is a contested term, with scholars in a range of dis-
ciplines engaged in active disagreement over its definition.19 
They disagree not only about the dividing line between emotion 
and cognition, but also over the definition of different emotions.20 
Complicating matters, these definitions may be culturally contin-
gent-different societies may answer the question "what is an 
emotion" or identify appropriate emotional responses in different 
ways.21 Americans, for example, are more optimistic than other 
cultures and tend to associate positive feelings with a compara-
tively wider range of events.22 
This article adopts the following definition, which reflects a de-
veloping consensus within the field: Emotions (1) are triggered by 
a particular stimulus that bears a relationship to an individual or 
collective goal; (2) involve a set of physiological changes (both 
conscious and unconscious); (3) provoke some change in cognitive 
activity by focusing attention, bringing particular memories into 
conscious awareness, or activating other thought processes; and 
(4) are tied to an action tendency to behave in a particular way.23 
For example, fear is generally triggered by a threat to the goal of 
survival, causes a set of physiological changes such as increased 
heart rate and perspiration, focuses conscious attention imme-
diately on the threat, and creates the action tendencies to flee 
and seek safety.24 
19. See KEITH OATLEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 28 (2d ed. 2006). 
20. See Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, The Cultural Construction of Self 
and Emotion: Implications for Social Behavior, in EMOTION AND CULTURE (Shinobu Ki-
tayama and Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 104. 
23. BRADER, supra note 13, at 51. 
24. See id. 
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One critical element causes major concern about emotion's im-
pact on decision-making capacity: emotions often operate as in-
tuitions that exist outside the realm of conscious thought.25 For 
example, people often sense danger before its source enters their 
full awareness, and their bodies begin preparing to respond to 
that danger even before they fully comprehend it.26 Much of the 
discussion that follows focuses on the intuitive aspect of emotion 
and the ways in which reliance on affective intuition helps to 
maintain stability within a constitutional community. 
II. COMMITMENT, IMAGINATION, AND THE DOMINANT VIEW 
In April 2005, Harvard constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe 
sent a letter to Associate Supreme Court Justice Stephen Brey-
er.27 In the letter, Tribe announced that he was suspending work 
on the third edition of his acclaimed constitutional law treatise 
due to confusion over the status of ''basic constitutional premis-
es."28 In a separate note to readers, he asserted that "the very 
working materials of American constitutional law may be in the 
process of changing"29 and called for "systemic attention" to "pop-
ular conceptions of constitutional law" that shape legal develop-
ment and governmental behavior.30 Specifically, Tribe hig-
hlighted the interpretive challenges posed by the "extraordinary 
politics of feeling" that surround contemporary constitutional dis-
course, and the tension between "the encompassing rhetoric of 
searing emotion" and long-standing constitutional principles.31 
25. This subconscious element is not unique to emotion. Indeed, a long-established 
body of scholarship has examined the role of cognitive heuristics (or mental shortcuts) and 
their ability to distort decision making in predictable ways. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Da-
niel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Ser. 531 (2005). 
26. See Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation, 
230 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 694-96 (2005) (discussing the benefits of heuristics, 
particularly in survival situations). 
27. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., to 
Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 29, 2005), in 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292-93 (2005). 
28. Id. at 292. 
29. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., to 
Interested Readers of American Constitutional Law (Apr. 29, 2005), in Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 294, 297 (2005). 
30. Id. at 299. 
31. Id. 
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Tribe's focus on the social practice of constitutionalism outside 
the courts and the relationship between constitutional law and 
emotion is well-placed. It was, after all, a series of collective emo-
tional outbursts in the form of violent social upheavals that re-
sulted in the establishment and maintenance of our most sacred 
constitutional commitments.32 Constitutions are written and 
changed in moments of extreme popular passion: revolution, civil 
war, and severe economic hardship are indispensable elements of 
American constitutional development.33 
Moreover, as any regular viewer of the nightly news or social 
historian can attest, constitutional interpretation is inseparable 
from a political culture that is bathed in emotion.34 The Constitu-
tion serves as a focal point for individual and collective expres-
sions of hope and fear, love and hate, and sympathy and dis-
gust.35 Constitutional history and doctrine contain many 
remnants of dreams realized, deferred, and denied, along with the 
expired emotions that set those alternative visions of constitu-
tional meaning into action.36 
Furthermore, like any religion, constitutional law sustains and 
legitimizes itself through emotional ties created by, facilitated by, 
and focused upon ritual, symbol, a foundational myth, and a core 
text.37 In this light, "constitutional culture"38 often transcends 
the legalistic and the logical, with emotion functioning as an es-
sential predicate for the American constitutional regime and a 
vehicle for collective expression of social aspirations. 
32. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 129 (2001); see also Frederick Schauer, The Constitution of Fear, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 84, 84-88 (William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (arguing that excessive fear contributed to 
flawed aspects of constitutional design). 
33. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3-8 (1998). 
34. See BRADER, supra note 13, at 183 (discussing findings that provide "strong sup-
port to the common belief that politicians routinely use ads to appeal to emotions"). 
35. See DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER 64-65 (1988); see also Robert 
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 36-37 (2003). 
36. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-42 (1983) (describing a "jurisgenerative" process where 
multiple constitutional norms are asserted by different interpretive communities, and the 
"jurispathic" role played by the Court in choosing between different interpretive visions). 
37. See KERTZER, supra note 35, at 60-65, 133. 
38. See Post, supra note 35, at 8 (defining constitutional culture as a "specific subset 
of culture that encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution"). 
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The Constitution also defines the broad parameters by which 
law and emotion intersect and recognize one another within pub-
lic life. When Chief Justice John Roberts likened his role as a 
constitutional interpreter to an umpire calling balls and strikes 
at his confirmation hearing,39 or when Justice Ruth Ginsberg, for 
the first time in her fifteen-year tenure on the Supreme Court, 
decided to read two "passionate and pointed" dissents aloud from 
the bench,40 they both made statements about the relationship 
between emotion and constitutional lawmaking.41 Disputes about 
prayer at graduation ceremonies or football games address the 
level of comfort with the emotions that are generated, released, 
and suppressed by particular types of public ritual.42 Cases about 
same-sex marriage, grandparent visitation, or sodomy laws ques-
tion whether the law will recognize particular types of love in 
human relationships.43 In addition, as the Court's recent ruling 
in Gonzales v. Carhart suggests, a woman's ability to terminate a 
pregnancy in a particular way may hinge on perceptions about 
the lasting emotional impact of late-term abortions.44 
Yet in spite of these cultural realities, the definition of consti-
tutional commitments is still commonly seen as a process domi-
nated by rationality, where interpretive rules and institutional 
constraints act to minimize emotion's taint on constitutional 
meaning.45 This account-dominant within the legal community 
and closely linked to the need for judicial supremacy-suggests 
that emotion should have as little to do with constitutional cul-
ture as possible.46 
39. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
40. Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsberg a New Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
2007, at Al. 
41. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Foreword: Demosprudence 
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (2008) (discussing the practice of "oral dissents" 
as a way for judges to engage an audience on an "emotional level"). 
42. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 307-08 (2000); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 592-93 (1992). 
43. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 
(2000); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
44. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007). 
45. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
THE BASIC QUESTIONS 13 (2007). 
46. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1078--79 (discussing how judges' views and ide-
ologies may overshadow issues of textual interpretation, framers' intent, and cost-benefit 
analysis). 
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This part makes three arguments. First, it argues that consti-
tutions provide a structure for two social phenomena that are 
central to human existence: commitment and imagination. 
Second, it links emotion, commitment, and imagination by ar-
guing that constitutional culture has long viewed emotion as de-
structive to both phenomena. Third, it examines how beliefs 
about emotion influenced core aspects of American constitutional 
design, including the procedures for making and altering consti-
tutional commitments. 
A. Commitment and Imagination in Constitutional Systems 
The primary function of written constitutions is to facilitate 
collective commitments that transcend time and the day-to-day 
battles of conventional politics.47 As many theorists have noted, 
constitutions establish precommitments: constraints on future 
behavior put into effect at Time 1 to ensure that action taken at 
some point in the future-Time 2-will conform with the course 
of action preferred at Time 1.48 Thus, a community makes a pre-
47. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 93 ("Written constitutionalism is properly un-
derstood as a nation's struggle to lay down and live out its own fundamental political 
commitments over time."). 
48. Id. at 116-17. For the past fifteen years or so, precommitment has been a budding, 
if not central, preoccupation for constitutional theorists. There are at least three reasons 
for the recent level of interest: originalism, the rise of the Rehnquist Court, and the de-
mise of the former Soviet Union. 
First, originalism-defining constitutional meaning as defined by the intent and motives 
of those who drafted the relevant constitutional provision-focuses on the virtues of pre-
commitment. See id. at 62. Originalism revolves around the ideas that commitments are 
fixed at a particular point in the past and that constitutional interpreters can only locate 
the limits of present-day or future constraints by defining the precise understanding of a 
constitutional commitment at the moment it was made. See id. at 88, 185. As Justice Sca-
lia, Judge Bork, and others began to provide credibility and intellectual firepower for ori-
ginalism as an interpretive model in contemporary constitutional lawmaking, justifica-
tions for, and critiques of, precommitment seeped into the debate over its original 
meaning. See id. at 64-65. 
Second, progressive scholars began to experience widespread frustration over the 
Court's shift to the right. The result has been a spate of recent theories about the mechan-
ics of constitutional change, relying on interdisciplinary work in history, political science, 
and sociology, with the partial goal of legitimizing interpretive activity that occurs outside 
the judiciary. See id. at 73. Several progressive scholars have reframed constitutional go-
vernance as a form of popular sovereignty, endorsing the ability of "the People" to stake 
independent claims about constitutional meaning outside of Article V. See id. at 70-71. 
This too required engagement with precommitment, but focused on determining how pre-
commitments are negotiated and redefining the parties involved in that negotiation 
process. 
Third, the end of the Cold War led to a new round of constitution drafting in the past fif. 
teen years, particularly as new republics formed out of the former Soviet Union. Evgeni 
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commitment at Time 1 knowing that the precommitment (a) will 
restrict its ability to act at Time 2 and (b) may indeed preclude a 
course of action that the community, for good or bad reasons, 
wants to engage in at Time 2.49 
Constitutional provisions, by operating as supreme law and re-
quiring a higher threshold for adoption and amendment than or-
dinary statutes,50 act as the primary legal device for establishing 
and enforcing shared legal precommitments. Constitutional pre-
commitments can take a range of forms: processes for collective 
decision making, institutional behaviors and limitations that em-
body a particular set of values, and mechanisms for defining new 
precommitments or altering existing ones.51 
Why would a society willingly restrict its ability to engage in a 
particular desired action at an unknown point in the future? 
Commitments, in legal and less formal incarnations, benefit so-
ciety because they promote consistency. Social psychologists have 
long noted that a desire for consistency is a central motivator for 
human behavior, in part due to its ability to promote stable, pre-
dictable decision making and consequences.52 This, in turn, pro-
motes efficient decision making-individuals and institutions can 
make choices and take risks with reduced information-gathering 
costs, an enhanced ability to predict outcomes, an ability to trust 
and predict the actions of others, and a sense of confidence that 
comes from day-to-day continuity.53 Consistency also allows com-
plex systems and large numbers of people to coordinate behavior, 
which facilitates the success of shared endeavors and the 
achievement of common goals.54 
Tanchev, Historical and Psychological Sources Shaping Constitutionalism and Constitu-
tional Performance in the Post-Communist Societies, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 141, 143 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephen, III eds., 1995). 
With the terms of precommitments being hashed out by a new generation of constitutional 
framers, there was a new market for lessons learned from past attempts to design pre-
commitment procedures. 
49. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 116-17. 
50. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 101 (2000). There are a range of devices that constitutions use to establish 
this higher threshold, such as requiring supermajorities, creating delays, or imposing ad-
ditional costs. Id. 
51. See id. at 8&-92. 
52. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 54 (4th ed. 2001). 
53. See id. at 61-68. 
54. See id. at 95-96. 
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Commitment strategies are among the best available vehicles 
to promote consistency;55 if someone makes a commitment, it 
creates "personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consis-
tently with that commitment."56 Externally, consistency is consi-
dered an attractive social trait-human beings want other people 
to like them and therefore want to be perceived as consistent by 
others.57 Internally, consistency offers individuals an efficient 
shortcut through the time and agony it takes to make difficult de-
cisions.58 
Hence, continuity and stability are among the primary benefits 
associated with a written constitution. Public commitments-
particularly those made in writing-harness these internal and 
external pressures and serve as the most effective mechanisms to 
ensure consistent behavior over time.59 Constitutions capitalize 
on these social realities, using written commitments-backed by 
fidelity to law-to promote consistent behavior. 
The consistency embedded in constitutional commitments is in 
perpetual tension with another activity that is central to both 
human existence and constitutional culture: imagination. Consti-
tutions provide a structure for imagining and negotiating collec-
tive aspirations for the future. The text provides a set of substan-
tive dreams for a better world,60 and the process of constitutional 
lawmaking-both within and outside the courts-provides a 
structure for a cultural conversation in which citizens, as partici-
pants in a constitutional culture, envision, negotiate, and fight for 
a better world in the years and decades to come.61 Moreover, by 
its very terms, the Federal Constitution remains an unfinished 
55. Id. at 61. 
56. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). 
57. See id. at 54 (showing that inconsistency is perceived as an "undesirable social 
trait" (citing A.R. Allgeier et al., The Waffle Phenomenon: Negative Evaluations of Those 
Who Shift Attitudinally, 9 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 170, 179 (1979)); S.E. Asch, Forming 
Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 258, 273-75 (1946)). 
58. Id. at 55. 
59. See id. at 68-70. 
60. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986) (describing the Constitution as "em-
bod[ying] the aspiration to social justice, brotherhood, and human dignity that brought 
this nation into being" and "the lodestar for our aspirations"). 
61. See Post, supra note 35, at 8. 
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document. By setting out an amendment procedure, Article V re-
cognizes the text's imperfections and the need for continued inno-
vation.62 
Imagination about the future is, thus, essential to a constitu-
tional system. When individuals try to amend the Constitution or 
interpret its meaning, the future-even from a short-term pers-
pective-is never far from their minds. This is true even in doc-
trinal areas, such as substantive due process, which demand a 
look backward in time to examine the past for evidence of the na-
tion's history and tradition.63 Even there, the interpretive frame 
constructs an imagined vision of the future that provides cultural 
continuity through a close link with the past. 
In constitutional development, commitment and imagination 
are both mutually dependent and in irreconcilable tension. Im-
agination forms visions of a lasting future that inspire constitu-
tional commitments into being; commitments provide stimuli for 
constitutional imagination, because change so often results from 
dissatisfaction with present commitments and the dim prospects 
of a stagnant future. Conversely, commitments stifle imagination 
by creating procedural and substantive roadblocks to realizing 
imagined alternatives: Imagination constrains commitment by 
counseling against creating restrictions today that might inhibit a 
better tomorrow. In part, this paradoxical relationship is attri-
butable to the different temporal perspectives embedded in each 
behavior-commitment looks to the past, while imagination looks 
to the future. 
B. The Dominant View: Dualism and Rationality-Preferencing 
Our constitutional system reflects a dominant theory of human 
behavior that views emotion as destructive to the maintenance of 
existing constitutional commitments and to the process of imagin-
ing new ones.64 This view contains two core elements. 
First, it relies upon a rigid dualism that sets reason, cognition, 
deliberation, mind, and thought in irreconcilable opposition 
against emotion, affect, intuition, heart, and feeling. Second, it 
62. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 12-13 (2005). 
63. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). 
64. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
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subscribes to rationality-preferencing-the notion that within 
this dualistic framework, decisions based on reason and delibera-
tion are better than decisions made under the influence of emo-
tion and intuition.65 
This adverse relationship between constitutional law and emo-
tion flows directly from a view of human behavior that treats 
emotion as corrosive to public decision making and to the collec-
tive search for a common good.66 From the perspective of com-
mitment and imagination, emotion causes a society to make un-
wise commitments based on short-term desires, discard existing 
commitments made during a period of calmer and rational think-
ing, and imagine new commitments that are destructive to other 
constitutional values. 
As a result, constitutional commitments are often designed as 
safeguards against emotion's potential to distort decision making 
by constitutional actors.67 As George Marcus and his co-authors 
describe it, critics have derided emotion's influence on decision 
making in four different ways. First, emotion displaces reason 
through overstimulation, which makes careful deliberative con-
sideration of rational alternatives impossible.68 Second, emotion 
distracts by drawing individuals' attention to irrelevant consider-
ations and distorting their ability to assess risk and relative bene-
fits.69 Third, emotion leads to intransigence by creating an inten-
sity of belief that is immune to new information or persuasion.70 
Finally, emotion facilitates self-absorption, making it impossible 
to consider larger consequences or public goals. 71 
65. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
66. See ROBERT c. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 55 (1990) ("In many versions of [social contract] theory, justice be-
comes a matter of reason whose purpose is to counter and control the unruly and usually 
selfish dictates of our natural passions."). 
67. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 272 (1995), PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 8 (1999). 
68. GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 
18-19 (2000). 
69. Id. at 19. 
70. Id. at 19-20. 
71. Id. at 20-21. For a somewhat different laundry list of the ways in which emotion 
potentially undermines cognition and sound judgment, see ELSTER, supra note 50, at 87; 
HALL, supra note 12, at 13. 
2009) OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS 637 
Taken as a whole, the dominant view treats emotion in public 
life as a threat to stability and a vehicle for injustice, intolerance, 
violence, and political instability. 72 This view of human behavior 
influenced the development of constitutional institutions and pro-
cedures at the time of the nation's founding, and found wide-
spread reinforcement from theorists, judges, and legal academics 
throughout the two centuries that followed. 
1. Dualism and Rationality-Preferencing at the Founding 
The dominant view's rigid dualism was prominent in the minds 
of those drafting and marketing the new American Constitu-
tion. 73 It drew on a long and distinguished intellectual tradition 
within Western political and philosophical development74 that 
separated "reason from passion, thinking from feeling, [and] cog-
nition from emotion."75 In The Federalist Papers, Publius envi-
sioned "passions" as diametrically opposed to reason.76 He patho-
logized the "sudden breese of passion"77 as "angry,"78 
"malignant,"79 "transient,"80 "irregular," and subject to the "artful 
misrepresentation of interested men."81 Passion threatened to 
"drown" ... the mild voice of reason,"82 resulting in constitutional 
governance dominated by "[a]mbition, avarice, personal animosi-
ty, [and] party opposition."83 
Within this dualistic framework, the framers weighed in solidly 
on the reason/deliberation side of the battle,84 in line with a long-
72. See Hall, supra note 12, at 24-25. 
73. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 116 n.26 ("The reason/passion trope is a strong 
theme in the Federalist Papers."). 
74. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 45; THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 121 (Allan Bloom 
trans., Basic Books 2d ed. 1991); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral 
Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 
1, 1-2 & n.4 (2005); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Foreword: 
Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 32 n. 78 (2007). 
75. LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 24. 
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 343 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
79. Id. 
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 77, at 482. 
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob B. Cooke ed., 1961). 
84. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 269; George E. Marcus, The Psychology of Emotion 
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held perception that "passions are a negative force in human be-
havior."85 In part, this reflected Enlightenment beliefs that rea-
son was critical to human progress86 and that emotion was in-
compatible with liberal democracies because it serves "as the 
basis for intemperateness, ethnocentrism, swift and intractable 
prejudices, and thoughtlessness."87 
Throughout The Federalist Papers, Publius described reason as 
superior to emotion, deliberation as superior to intuition, and 
both emotion and intuition as inconsistent with the common "rule 
of law" values: consistency, predictability, and stability.88 In Fe-
deralist No. 49, James Madison set forth his theory that reason is 
essential to the constitutional order about as clearly as one could 
imagine: "it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to con-
trol and regulate the government. The passions ought to be con-
trolled and regulated by the government."89 Publius saw passion 
as intimately connected to factionalism and initiating the irra-
tional desire to form groups that were forever locked in constant 
battle with other groups.90 As Madison noted, "In all very numer-
ous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never 
fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen 
been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a 
mob."91 
As Paul Kahn put it, the Federalist mission was "to bring 
science to popular government."92 Reflection and deliberation 
were deemed essential to good public decision making,93 and rea-
and Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 182, 185 (David 0. Sears et 
al. eds., 2003). 
85. Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 6, at 619. 
86. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 466 (1996). 
87. Marcus, Emotions and Politics, supra note 6, at 198. 
88. See RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: JAMES MADISON AND THE 
HEARTLESS EMPIRE OF REASON 81 (1995) (noting that Madison makes no positive refer-
ence to "passion" in the Federalist Papers); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, 
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015 
(2005) (identifying rule-of-law values). 
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 76, at 343. 
90. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 268. 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 340 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
92. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 12 (1992); see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 152-53 (1996). 
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 77, at 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). 
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son enabled social choices to align with the public good.94 In 
Hannah Arendt's words, the founders saw "government in the 
image of individual reason" and "the rule of government over the 
governed according to the age-old model of the rule of reason over 
the passions."95 As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 
15, government is necessary because "the passions of men will not 
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without con-
straint."96 Passions were seen as erratic, creating a "turbulent 
and changing" populace unable to "judge or determine right."97 
To a large extent, the concern over the corrosive impact of emo-
tion on decision making reflected the immediate challenges of 
managing a volatile post-revolutionary environment, where 
shared emotional bonds formed in the heat of battle against a 
common British enemy were disintegrating.98 Moreover, the fra-
mers' concerns about emotion reflected the tumult that sur-
rounded post-founding American politics.99 Legislative turnover 
was high, major ideological schisms existed about fundamental 
issues of economic and foreign policy, and a vibrant press stoked 
public emotion and agitation.100 Political violence in eighteenth-
century America was far more commonplace than it is today, and 
public participation in political life was marked by "mobbing," 
strong rhetoric, and other acts that involved highly visible emo-
tional displays.101 
Publius's rhetoric around emotion was not particularly 
nuanced and grouped a wide range of very strong and different 
emotions under the umbrella of "passions."102 The subtlety with 
which people describe different emotions today did not appear in 
94. See KAHN, supra note 92, at 15. But see MARCUS, supra note 13, at 27-28 (offering 
evidence of a more ambivalent attitude towards reason in The Federalist Papers). 
95. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 91 (1963). 
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
97. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 299 (Max Farrand ed., 
1966) [hereinafter 1 RECORDS]. 
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 76, at 341 (ed.,) (1961). 
99. See Jan Lewis, "Those Scenes for Which Alone My Heart Was Made''.· Affection and 
Politics in the Age of Jefferson and Hamilton, in AN EMOTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 52, 54 (Peter N. Stearns & Jan Lewis eds., 1998). 
100. See id. 
101. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 156 (2004). 
102. See SUSAN JAMES, PASSION AND ACTION: THE EMOTIONS IN SEVENTEENTH· 
CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 4-5 (1997). 
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his writings; he treated happiness and sadness, empathy and dis-
gust, and anger and elation as one and the same.103 
Despite this broad-brush perspective, the framers recognized 
some useful purposes for emotion in creating a constitutional re-
gime. Specifically, they saw emotion as important for establishing 
the new Constitution's legitimacy and for developing a sense of 
national identity.104 As historian Jan Lewis noted, "[T]he found-
ers of the new national government knew that one of their great-
est challenges was to stimulate affection for the new national 
government."105 Madison derided those who felt that "the people 
of America, knit together as they are by so many chords of affec-
tion, can no longer live together as members of the same fami-
ly."106 
But even emotions that might prove helpful to the nation-
building project-bonds that create loyalty and cohesion within a 
heterogeneous group-were treated with suspicion. Madison be-
lieved that those loyalties would operate at a much smaller level 
within a comparatively large democracy, creating factions that 
would encourage division rather than unity, and would ultimately 
undermine the nation-building agenda.107 He viewed the emo-
tional unity and enthusiasm surrounding the Revolution as tem-
porary and thought that the "passions most unfriendly to order 
and concord" would soon reappear once the immediacy of the 
Revolution had vanished into memory.108 
2. The Dominant View in Constitutional Culture 
Despite the unique historical circumstances, the framers' 
theory of human behavior and decision making has continued to 
resonate throughout American constitutional history and into the 
modern era. In particular, constitutional commitments are seen 
as a safeguard against emotion's negative impact on public life. 
Abraham Lincoln's famed 1838 Lyceum speech captured the do-
minant view's legacy in its starkest form: "Passion has helped us; 
103. See id. at 5. 
104. HALL, supra note 12, at 31; MARCUS, supra note 13, at 24-25. 
105. Lewis, supra note 99, at 57. 
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 88 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
108. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 76, at 341. 
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but can do so no more. It will in future be our enemy. Reason, 
cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the ma-
terials for our future support and defence."109 Unsurprisingly, he 
deemed reason synonymous with "general intelligence, ... moral-
ity, and ... a reverence for the constitution."110 
Lincoln's perspective aligned with standard views of citizenship 
that position rational judgment as the sole means for obtaining 
substantive and procedural legitimacy, just outcomes, and social 
progress.111 Under this model, citizens must have the opportunity 
to consider-in a calm, sober state-the implications and conse-
quences of different options and decisions.112 Emotion and intui-
tion threaten democratic progress, which can only occur through 
deliberative or republican processes that advance the rule of rea-
son.113 
In turn, emotion threatens the maintenance of constitutional 
order because it can potentially lead individuals to ignore prior 
commitments or imagine new commitments that are irrational or 
unwise. As a result, popular involvement in defining constitu-
tional meaning should not be trusted, particularly in situations 
where elements critical to reason-knowledge and time to obtain, 
consider, and evaluate relevant information-are absent. 
The legacy of rationality-preferencing bleeds into many aspects 
of contemporary constitutional law and politics. As any observer 
of a first-year constitutional law class will notice, legal elites are 
systematically trained to discount and ignore emotion, moral in-
tuition, and imagination when trying to define, interpret, and ad-
vocate on behalf of constitutional commitments. Comments that 
reflect feelings are actively discouraged (or secretly feared) by 
most professors. This discouragement stems from a concern that 
109. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois 
(Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 115 (Roy P. Bas-
ler ed., 1953). 
110. See id. 
111. See James H. Kuklinski et al., Thinking About Political Tolerance, More or Less 
with More or Less Information, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 225, 227 
(George E. Marcus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993); George E. Marcus et al., Dynamic 
Models of Emotional Response: The Multiple Roles of Affect in Politics, 5 RES. IN 
MICROPOLITICS 33, 34 (1996). 
112. But see Marcus et al., supra note 111, at 34-35 (explaining how humans do not 
always process all information before making a decision, as the rational-judgment theory 
would suggest). 
113. Kuklinski et al., supra note 111, at 227. 
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the classroom will reflect pathological and seemingly uncontrolla-
ble behaviors often associated with emotion.114 Instead, constitu-
tional law becomes interchangeable with "thinking like a lawyer," 
perpetuated by a Socratic method pedagogy that structures inqui-
ries to ensure that feelings are kept under tight control and on 
limited display. This perpetuates what psychologist Carol Gilli-
gan calls a dissociative state-a condition under which individu-
als are not permitted to know what they know.115 
Beyond the classroom, the notion that emotion is destructive to 
the process of constitutional commitment making, interpretation, 
and inquiry finds reinforcement throughout contemporary consti-
tutional culture.116 In particular, this notion operates as the ex-
clusive behavioral model for constitutional interpretation by 
judges,117 with "emotional" thrown around as an epithet at judges 
who are perceived as advancing a personal moral agenda.118 As 
Richard Posner notes, "The law itself is conventionally regarded 
as a bastion of 'reason' conceived of as the antithesis of emotion, 
as operating to rein in the emotionality of the behavior that gives 
rise to legal disputes."119 Consider, for example, the Casey joint 
opinion's description of the forces seeking to undermine Roe v. 
114. For an interesting example of an academic community wrestling with the role of 
emotion in constitutional discourse, see Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2005 _ 04_10-2005 _04_16.sh tml#l 113585884 (Apr. 
15, 2005, 13:24 EST). 
115. CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE: A NEW MAP OF LOVE 23-24, 228 
(2003). 
116. See Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Delibera-
tion and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L .REV. 231, 234 (2005). 
117. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal 
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 665-66 (1989); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental 
Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 
1994, at 13 (addressing how Justice Blackmun's reliance on emotion when deciding cases 
rendered him ineffective as a Justice). For alternative perspectives on the relationship be-
tween the judicial role and emotion, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) 
(arguing that "[h]eart and mind ... cannot be altogether parted in law more than in life"); 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of Law", 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
3, 3 (1988) (claiming that the "interplay of ... reason and passion[ ] does not taint the 
judicial process, but is in fact central to its vitality"). For a historical perspective on this 
theory of judicial independence, see Bruce A Green & Rebecca Rophie, Regulating Discour-
tesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
118. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing 
majority opinion as "long on emotive utterance and ... short on relevant legal citation"); 
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Justice Anthony Kennedy, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 16, 19. 
119. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW 309, 309 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
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Wade: "Some of those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional 
reactions; others may proceed from principles worthy of profound 
respect."120 Or, the final words of the Eleventh Circuit panel de-
cision denying Terry Schiavo's parents' motion for a temporary 
restraining order directing her husband to bring her to a hospital 
for medical treatment: "While the position of our dissenting col-
league has emotional appeal, we as judges must decide this case 
on the law."121 Or, Justice Anthony Kennedy's recent portrayal of 
law as an effort to ''bring rationality to an existence that can be 
irrational and chaotic."122 As Justice Harry Blackmun stated in 
his majority opinion in Roe, the Court's job "is to resolve the issue 
by constitutional measurement, free of emotion."123 
For the most part, constitutional theory has operated to rein-
force the notion of constitutional commitments as barriers 
against the corrosive effects of emotion. This has happened pri-
marily through reliance upon two popular analogies to explain 
and justify constitutional commitments. In the first analogy, a 
commitment operates as "Peter sober" speaking to "Peter 
drunk"-the voice of past reason guiding a confused individual 
through a turbulent, intoxicated present.124 In the second analo-
gy, drawn from The Odyssey, Ulysses confronts the Sirens, whose 
beautiful song lures sailors to their deaths.125 Unwilling to miss 
the opportunity to hear their singing, he instructs his crew to 
plug their ears and tie him to the mast of the boat before they 
meet the Sirens.126 The crew is further instructed to lash him 
more tightly to the mast if he protests.127 The plan is successfully 
implemented-Ulysses is able to enjoy the show and survive the 
trip-successfully stifling the uncontrollable urges of future pas-
120. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). 
121. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (per cu-
riam). 
122. See Rosen, supra note 118, at 16. 
123. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); see also State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 369 
(1845) (declaring arguments that the New Jersey Constitution forbids slavery as "ad-
dressed to the feelings rather than to the legal intelligence of the court"). 
124. For a history of the analogy, see Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Demo-
cratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential 
Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1988 & n.13 (2003). 
125. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 173-74 (T.E. Lawrence trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) 
(1932). 
126. Id. at 1 73. 
127. Id. 
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sion.128 Both analogies reflect a theory of human behavior that 
establishes a rigid separation between reason and emotion, with 
calm, deliberative reason offered as a clearly superior alternative 
to the immediacy and destructive effects of emotion.129 
Often, this perspective is closely tied to the need for judicial 
supremacy-the notion that the Court should serve as the sole 
and final arbiter of constitutional meaning. As Richard Parker 
recognized, constitutional theory has a history of pathologizing 
popular constitutional engagement as "emotional" instead of "rea-
sonable," "impulsive" rather than "deliberate," "self-centered" in-
stead of "public-spirited," "abusive" rather than "respectful," and 
"intoxicated" as opposed to "sober."130 Popular emotional senti-
ments are viewed as destructive to the constitutional endeavor131 
and perceived as "irrational response[s] [that do] not evidence a 
process of moral reasoning worthy of respect."132 
Finally, psychological dynamics underlying interest-group poli-
tics feed the rationality-preferencing norm as well. Members of a 
group tend to see their own group's perspective and decision-
making process as the product of rational thought. By contrast, a 
given group will more likely see the decision making of other 
groups as governed by emotion and feeling.133 The result is a con-
stitutional culture where groups with a stake in the outcome of 
an interpretive debate lay claim to the exalted status of rationali-
ty using accusations about emotion to deride other perspectives 
and diminish their opponents' intellectual stature or relative so-
cial status.134 
128. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (1984). 
129. For a critique of the Ulysses analogy, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT 268 (1999). 
130. PARKER, supra note 8, at 57-58. 
131. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG 19 (2006) (outlining the framers' view that "the general pub-
lic should be educated to feel only 'veneration' for their Constitution rather than be en-
couraged to use their critical faculties" to interpret its meaning). 
132. Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1354 
(2005). 
133. See Jared B. Kenworthy & Norman Miller, Attributional Biases About the Origins 
of Attitudes: Externality, Emotionality, and Rationality, 82 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 693, 702 (2002). 
134. See id. at 693 (quoting opposing sides of Bush v. Gore that suggest "strategic, 
group-serving use" of allegations about whether a court's decision is grounded in "sound 
reasoning''); see also Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
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C. Emotion Management in Constitutional Design 
Constitutional law, like many other forms of law, functions as 
an elaborate system of emotion management.135 Through its se-
paration of powers provisions, the Constitution channels emo-
tional expression into particular legislative, judicial, and admin-
istrative fora. Through its directives on institutional structure, it 
establishes decision-making rules and customary practices that 
validate, reject, or transform emotional expression in particular 
ways and delineate the actors whose emotional expressions are 
recognized within particular contexts.136 And by providing me-
chanisms for the resolution of social conflict, the Constitution re-
strains the strong emotions triggered by uncertainty or unex-
plained phenomena.137 
In an effort to manage the adverse effects of emotion, the do-
minant view influenced core features of constitutional design. 
Most prominently, it informed the design of Article V, which sets 
out the formal mechanics for establishing or altering constitu-
tional commitments.138 
Article V serves as the connective tissue between imagination 
and commitment in three different ways: procedural, institution-
al, and substantive. From a procedural perspective, it regulates 
the balance between commitment and imagination within the 
realm of formal amendment, establishing the precise terms under 
which constitutional commitments can be made, altered, and bro-
ken. From an institutional perspective, it constrains imagination 
through procedural hurdles in the amendment process and chan-
nels imagination into other arenas, transferring the locus of con-
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 823 (2001). 
135. See GOLEMAN, supra note 9, at 5 ("[T]he first laws and proclamations of ethics ... 
can be read as attempts to harness, subdue, and domesticate emotional life."); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAl\iE, AND THE LAW 12 (2004); Peggy A. 
Thoits, The Sociology of Emotions, 15 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 317, 336 (1989) ("[E]motion 
norms are produced by and function to sustain dominant institutional arrangements."). 
136. See Francesca Polletta, The Laws of Passion, 35 L. & Soc'v REV. 467, 473-76 
(2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 119) (discussing how courts handle 
litigants' emotional expressions). 
137. See GILBERT, supra note 10, at 187-89 (stating that unexplained events have a 
heightened emotional impact). 
138. Whether Article V provides the exclusive method for constitutional amendment is 
a matter of significant debate. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1737, 1760-61 (2007) (arguing that civil rights statutes and advances have achieved 
the functional equivalent of constitutional amendments). 
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stitutional innovation toward the courts, state constitutions, and 
other non-Article V mechanisms for change. And from a substan-
tive perspective, it requires consensus among a wide range of po-
litical actors at both the state and federal level. This impacts the 
imagination process itself, altering visions for change139 and ma-
nipulating the participants and levels of abstraction at which 
conversations about America's constitutional future take place.140 
In regulating the balance between commitment and imagina-
tion, the framers designed Article V as a means of emotion man-
agement and control, with emotion seen as destructive to the es-
tablishment and maintenance of sound constitutional 
commitments.141 In Federalist No. 49, Madison responded to 
Thomas Jefferson's proposal for a more relaxed amendment stan-
dard for the Virginia State Constitution. Madison noted that sub-
jecting constitutional questions to frequent public debate raised 
"[t]he danger of disturbing the public tranquility" and "interest-
ing . . . public passions."142 He also pointed out that passions 
threatened the "true merits of the question," which should only be 
represented by reason.143 
Article V relies upon a range of procedural devices to minimize 
the influence of emotion in the commitment-making process. Not-
ably, Article V makes the Constitution extremely difficult to 
amend, particularly when compared with amendment provisions 
in other constitutions.144 The process of garnering significant 
139. See William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and 
Amendability-A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965, 1974-80 (2003) 
(attributing the Constitution's failure to recognize social welfare rights to Article V con-
straints). 
140. See John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1957-59 (2003). 
141. This is not to say that checks against passion were the only forces underlying Ar-
ticle V's design. The framers were clearly concerned about the challenges presented by the 
unanimity requirement in the Articles of Confederation. See James Madison, Speech Dur-
ing Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDER'S 
CONSTITUTION 580, 582 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Federalism con-
cerns also motivated the framers to provide an alternative method of constitutional 
amendment that was independent of Congress. See Records of the Federal Convention, 
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra, 576, 576-78. 
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 76, at 340 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
143. Id. at 342-43. 
144. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPOND-
ING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 237, 
260-61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
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support at both the federal and state levels imposes significant 
transaction costs and time delays, which allow ample time for so-
ber second thoughts.145 Further, the central role of elected repre-
sentatives in the amendment proposal and ratification processes, 
rather than direct referenda schemes that appear in other na-
tional and state constitutions, serves as yet another mechanism 
to dilute popular passion.146 
Emotion management significantly influenced the formation of 
other areas of constitutional design as well. For example, Article 
I's bicameralism and presentment requirements act as checks on 
emotion's potentially dangerous impact on political behavior by 
establishing multiple fora for deliberation and slowing the legis-
lative process to allow time for sober reflection.147 Indeed, Madi-
son envisioned the Senate as an essential "defense to the people 
against their own temporary errors and delusions ... stimulated 
by some irregular passion."148 The framers placed age limits on 
public office to ensure, at least in part, a level of emotional ma-
turity among the political elite.149 This comported with a vision of 
public service and republican government that "does not require 
an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breese of passion, or 
to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the 
arts of men."150 In the modern era, the removal of constitutional 
obstacles to the development of the administrative state, like the 
demise of the non-delegation doctrine, reflects a judgment about 
the desirability of rational judgment in the development of public 
policy. 
III. COMMITMENT 
While the dominant view continues to hold sway over constitu-
tional law and theory, other disciplines have begun to revisit its 
core assumptions. In recent years, developments in the social and 
natural sciences have questioned the dualistic relationship be-
tween reason and emotion and begun to recharacterize emotion 
145. ELSTER, supra note 50, at 101, 103. 
146. See Ackerman, supra note 138, at 1775-76. 
147. See ELSTER, supra note 50, at 130-31. 
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 81, at 425. 
149. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTI-
TUTION 30 (2005). 
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 77, at 42. 
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as a vital and valuable component of sound decision making com-
ponent,151 These developments, in turn, have implications for the 
way constitutional theory conceives of the relationship between 
emotion and commitment. 
Constitutional governance facilitates commitment over time 
and with it, the substantial benefits associated with individual 
and collective consistency.152 Under the dominant view, emotions 
undermine these constitutional commitments by displacing rea-
son. They "flood consciousness," leading individuals to abandon 
previously held commitments based on impulse, whimsy, and 
without appropriate thought and consideration.153 During the 
Constitutional Convention, Hamilton referenced this concern ex-
plicitly, describing "the popular passions ... [that] spread like 
wild fire, and become irresistible."154 In a similar vein, Madison 
expressed concern about the threat to democracy presented by the 
"turbulency ... of unruly passions."155 
There is no doubt that, under certain circumstances, affective 
forces can lead people astray and distort consciousness in ways 
that can be destructive to their short- and long-term interests.156 
These forces can alter individuals' perspective on the future,157 
warp their perception of risk,158 facilitate prejudice,159 manipu-
late attitudes based on mood,160 ignore information,161 distort 
processes of analytic and analogical reasoning,162 contribute to 
151. LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 19-20. 
152. See supra notes 4 7-63 and accompanying text. 
153. See LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 19-20 (discussing how emotions work to motivate 
behavior). 
154. 1 RECORDS, supra note 97, at 289. 
155. Id. at 430--31. 
156. See Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 6, at 627-28; George Loewenstein, Out of 
Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996). 
157. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Future Is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective 
Forecasting, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430, 430--31 (2002). 
158. See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-
Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689, 689 (1999). 
159. See Susan T. Fiske, What We Know About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Prob-
lem of the Century, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 123, 123 (2002) (reviewing 
research connecting fear and anxiety to automatic prejudice against particular groups). 
160. See Blumenthal, supra note 74, 25--27. 
161. See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L. J. 1977, 2011 (2001). 
162. See Norbert Schwarz & Herbert Bless, Happy and Mindless, But Sad and Smart? 
The Impact of Affective States on Analytic Reasoning, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 
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the prioritization of short-term benefit over long-term gain,163 
and create bias in certain decision-making contexts.164 
Yet these critiques do not tell the whole story. This part uses 
recent developments in the social and natural sciences to argue 
that emotion-derided by the dominant view for its potential to 
destabilize commitments-also serves as a vital stabilizing force, 
enabling constitutional commitments to survive and thrive over 
time and across generations. 
Specifically, emotions (1) help turn abstract commitments into 
individual habits and monitor people's adherence to those com-
mitments through enthusiasm and anxiety, (2) operate as a stabi-
lizing force for individual behavior and political preferences with-
in a large and heterogeneous constitutional culture, and (3) are 
integral to interpretation-the process by which a society deter-
mines the precise meaning and terms of preexisting constitution-
al commitments. 
A. Habit, Enthusiasm, and Anxiety 
Habit provides the essential bridge between constitutional 
commitment and emotion, as effective commitments often embed 
themselves in habitual behavior. For example, if a professor 
wants to make a commitment that she will be on time for her 9:00 
a.m. class, her chances of success will increase dramatically if she 
establishes a habitual morning routine that allows her to predict 
reliably the precise time she must leave her home to make it to 
class. 
Constitutional systems work in a similar way. If one goal of a 
constitutional system is to maintain consistency over time, habi-
tual behavior and customary practices are the best available me-
chanisms to sustain constitutional institutions.165 For example, if 
55, 56 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991); Neta C. Crawford, The Passion of World Politics: 
Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships, 24 INT'L SECURITY 116, 141-42 
(2000). 
163. See Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Econom-
ics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9, 40-41 (2005). 
164. This bias is created particularly when emotions are strongly held. See Martha C. 
Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice": Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW, supra note 119, at 19, 35-38; Rose McDermott, The Feeling of Rationality: The 
Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 691, 700-01 
(2004). 
165. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 102, 161, 163-64 (1990); Richard 
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widespread citizen participation in elections is essential to the 
continued survival of our constitutional system, voting should be-
come habitual behavior. Similarly, if citizens who disagree with a 
given decision are called upon to comply with it nonetheless,166 
their willingness to do so is based, in no small part, on habits of 
compliance with the rule of law that legitimate the decision. In 
the end, individual and collective habits-including compliance 
with the rule of law-produce the consistency and predictability 
that are among the primary benefits of a written constitution. 
Habit is also essential to getting around the thorny problem of 
constitutional consent. Because those who participated in draft-
ing and ratifying the Constitution are long dead, the current in-
carnation of the American polity must reckon with a government 
"of the people" where none of "the people" ever formally consented 
to their current form of government.167 Instead, their consent, as 
John Locke recognized long ago, is often tacit.168 The practice of 
constitutional habits, rather than a conscious act of consent, pro-
vides contemporary democratic legitimacy for America's constitu-
tional order. 
According to the dominant view, emotion undermines the 
commitment-facilitating function of constitutions by causing indi-
viduals to discard existing commitments in favor of immediate 
short-term considerations, like addicts who "fall off the wa-
gon."169 Moreover, the unpredictable, subconscious, and intense 
nature of emotion facilitates inconsistent behavior.170 In this 
light, emotion becomes a real and substantial threat to rule-of-
law values and stability, which constitutional commitments and 
habits are designed to promote. Yet habit-the linchpin of consis-
tency and commitment-requires emotion to help establish and 
maintain habitual behavior. 
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795-96 (2005). 
166. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (explaining 
how the Constitution calls on people to accept a "common mandate" under the Constitu· 
tion). 
167. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 81. For an early articulation of this problem, 
see David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in 1 ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 
443, 447 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1875). 
168. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365-66 (Peter Laslett ed., 
1967). 
169. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text. 
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Most significantly, emotion-processing regions of the brain play 
a significant role in facilitating learned habitual behavior and the 
accompanying consistency and stability.171 A recent neuroimag-
ing study suggests a strong connection between emotional regions 
of the brain and habitual, addictive behavior, like smoking.172 
Researchers studying patients with damage to the insula-a re-
gion of the brain thought to trigger conscious bodily responses to 
anticipated emotional events (e.g., initiating the conscious urge to 
smoke by anticipating the pleasure of a cigarette)-discovered a 
strong relationship between the localized nature of the damage 
and the ability to quit smoking.173 As one of the researchers 
noted, "[T]he fact that insular damage breaks down a learned ha-
bit such as smoking, demonstrates a powerful link between habit 
and emotion or feeling."174 This is not to claim that nicotine ad-
diction is individually or socially beneficial. But, as a fairly ex-
treme form of commitment, it underscores the connection be-
tween emotion and habit and the ways in which people's 
emotional infrastructure facilitates the sort of consistency and 
stability that enable commitments to thrive. 
The intersection between habit and emotion also helps individ-
uals monitor their adherence to prior commitments. Political 
scientist George Marcus underscores the critical role of two emo-
tional subsystems--one dominated by enthusiasm and the other 
by anxiety and fear-that govern individual political behavior.175 
As he puts it, "Affective attachments and affective control sys-
tems anchor enduring patterns of behavior" by rewarding beha-
vior that is consistent with previously established goals and by 
monitoring the environment for departures from the norm.176 
The first system, dominated by enthusiasm, monitors individu-
als' progress toward particular goals and triggers positive emo-
tional responses (i.e., enthusiasm) when progress is made toward 
those goals.177 This, in turn, assists in the creation of habitual 
171. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 82-83. 
172. Nasir H. Naqvi et al., Damage to the Insula Disrupts Addiction to Cigarette Smok-
ing, 315 Ser. 531 (2007). 
173. Id. at 533. 
174. Carl Marziali, Smokers Quit After Brain Region Damage, USC NEWS, http://www. 
usc.edu/uscnews/stories/13312.html (quoting Hanna Damasio). 
175. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 65. 
176. Marcus, Emotions and Politics, supra note 6, at 223-24. 
177. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 81. 
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behavior. Through trial and error, emotions provide signals about 
which actions work best to achieve an objective and create auto-
matic dispositions to behave in ways that help achieve individual 
and collective goals.178 
Political advertising has long recognized this dynamic, using 
enthusiasm as an anchoring force for consistency and commit-
ment. For example, individuals who watch campaign advertise-
ments containing enthusiasm cues will more likely have their 
prior views about a candidate reinforced.179 Enthusiasm "rein-
force[s] existing preferences and discourage[s] change"180 and, in 
turn, functions as a stabilizing force in public opinion.181 
The second system, dominated by anxiety, triggers emotional 
responses when something departs from the norm and helps indi-
viduals monitor their external environments.182 This surveillance 
system is tied to threat and serves as an alert mechanism to focus 
attention to forces that are unusual or destabilizing.183 This 
enables individuals to immediately and efficiently channel their 
resources toward threats to stability and consistency. Hence, 
through anxiety and fear, people can detect and focus on "norma-
tive deviations" from the status quo that represent potential 
threats to their previously held commitments.184 They can then 
take appropriate action to maintain their commitments and ha-
bits. 
B. Emotions as a Stabilizing Force 
Commitments facilitate consistency and predictability. In the 
dualistic battle between reason and emotion, reason has always 
been seen as having consistency on its side and, with it, a mode of 
decision making that advances rule-of-law values.185 A growing 
body of research, however, suggests that emotion is a critical 
178. Id. at 81-82. 
179. BRADER, supra note 13, at 114-18. 
180. Id. at 118. 
181. Id. at 119. 
182. Elizabeth Theiss-Morse et al., Passion and Reason in Political Life: The Organiza· 
tion of Affect and Cognition and Political Tolerance, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC 
PUBLIC 248, 254, 266 (George E. Marcus & Russell C. Hanson eds., 1993). 
183. George E. Marcus et al., Linking Neuroscience to Political Intolerance and Politi· 
cal Judgment, 17 POL. & LIFE SCI. 165,168-69 (1998). 
184. Id. 
185. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
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force in stabilizing decisions and preferences over time and may 
play a much larger role in establishing consistency within a con-
stitutional regime than previously believed.186 
First and foremost, emotions enforce behavioral norms in an 
environment where constant monitoring of individual behavior is 
neither realistic nor desirable. When external threats of punish-
ment or reward are absent, emotions like embarrassment, pride, 
and vanity ensure individual and collective behavioral confor-
mance with established legal and cultural norms.187 Shame and 
guilt impose psychological costs on individual departures from 
collective commitments, whether or not someone else enforces the 
commitment.188 
Moreover, affective forces help stabilize people's evaluations of 
the world around them. The systems of social relationship-like 
families or nations-that enable stable, transgenerational com-
mitments to survive are held together by emotional bonds based 
in love and pride.189 These social relationships, particularly fami-
lies, are critical to the development of civic awareness and politi-
cal engagement.190 
Indeed, much of Americans' political behavior is grounded in 
emotions and habits191 that help citizens form and maintain sta-
ble partisan affiliations,192 shape our attitudes toward candi-
dates,193 dictate attitudes toward civil liberties,194 and motivate 
our desire to defend the status quo.195 For example, in a recent 
study, strongly partisan citizens who had an emotional stake in 
the outcome of the 2004 presidential election were confronted 
186. See, e.g., Theiss-Morse et al., supra note 182, at 266. 
187. See Susan Shott, Emotion and Social Life: A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis, 84 
AM. J. Soc. 1317, 1323-24 (1979). 
188. FRANK, supra note 15, at 53. 
189. See HAIDT, supra note 10, at 48-49. 
190. Hugh Mcintosh et al., The Influence of Family Political Discussion on Youth Civic 
Development: Which Parent Qualities Matter?, 40 POL. Ser. & POL. 495, 495 (2007). 
191. Kinder, supra note 6, at 279; MARCUS, supra note 13, at 84. 
192. See John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 339, 340 (2003). 
193. Robert P. Abelson et al., Affective and Semantic Components in Political Person 
Perception, 42 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 619, 619 (1982). 
194. GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., WITH MALICE TOWARD SOME: How PEOPLE MAKE 
CIVIL LIBERTIES JUDGMENTS (1995). 
195. See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-
Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Ser. 260, 261-62 (2005). 
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with information about their preferred candidate that would lead 
to an emotionally negative conclusion about the candidate.196 Ra-
ther than adopting the negative conclusion, most study partici-
pants adopted an alternative conclusion that minimized the im-
pact of the emotionally threatening information and favored their 
preferred candidate.197 During this reasoning process, research-
ers performed brain scans on the participants and observed in-
creased activity in brain regions involved in emotion 
processing.198 They concluded that neural information processing 
occurs differently when individuals have a "strong emotional 
stake" in the outcome of the election and that regions of the brain 
involved in "implicit [emotion] regulation" help maintain partisan 
attitudes in the face of potentially unfavorable information.199 
Emotions also stabilize preferences within a heterogeneous 
group. In one recent set of studies by Michael Tuan Pham, indi-
viduals were split into two groups and asked to evaluate a range 
of stimuli.200 One group was asked to pay attention to their feel-
ings about the stimuli and to disregard any reason-based assess-
ments.201 The other group was asked to make their evaluations 
purely on reason-based assessments.202 The studies concluded 
that judgments made by the feelings group showed greater con-
sistency across individuals than judgments made by the reason 
group.203 
In addition, affective forces play a role in creating consistent 
and stable preferences within individuals. One recent study de-
fined stable preferences through transitivity, meaning that for a 
set of objects-A, B, and C-if A is preferred over B and B is pre-
ferred over C, then A will be preferred over C.204 Participants 
196. Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An {MRI Study of Emo-
tional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 
18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1947, 1948 (2006). 
197. Id. at 1955. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Michel Tuan Pham et al., Affect Monitoring and the Primacy of Feelings in Judg-
ment, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 167, 171, 176, 178, 182 (2001). 
201. Id. at 171. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 184. 
204. Leonard Lee et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Preference Consistency, Emo-
tions, and Cognition 9 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925978 (click "Down-
load" hyperlink; then click "SSRN to open" hyperlink). 
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were asked to engage in a set of preference identification tasks 
under two different sets of conditions.205 One group was placed 
under a set of conditions that emphasized emotional processing in 
preference identification;206 the other group operated under con-
ditions that allowed for greater cognitive input.207 The studies 
confirmed a higher level of transitivity among the affect-based 
group, concluding that "emotional processes can also contribute to 
greater preference stability and consistency within individu-
als."208 
Moreover, emotion is not always the unpredictable, unruly 
force that the dominant view calls to mind, regardless of its vis-
ceral impact, often automatic nature, and potentially subcons-
cious roots. Instead, internal and external forces stabilize affec-
tive expression and constrain emotional response, rendering 
emotions far more predictable and stable than the dominant view 
would allow. 
Emotions are held in check, over time, by internal systems of 
regulation that disfavor emotional extremes.209 Hence, people 
over-predict the strength and duration of an emotional response 
to an event, due in part to their failure to recognize their internal 
ability to regulate their emotions in ways similar to body temper-
ature.210 Conscious behavioral and cognitive actions-distraction, 
venting, suppression, exercise, and cognitive reframing-also 
help stabilize the type and strength of an emotional response 
within particular parameters.211 
Externally, culture plays a major role in constructing-and 
therefore constraining-emotional response.212 From the world, 
205. See id. at 13, 17. 
206. Id. at 13. 
207. Id. at 17. 
208. Id. at 25. 
209. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affec-
tive Forecasting, 75 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 617, 618 (1998) (describing how pes-
simism acts as a defense mechanism curtailing happiness when a perceived negative event 
turns out not to be very bad). 
210. Id. at 617. 
211. See Randy J. Larsen & Zrjesdana Prizmic, Affect Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF 
SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 40, 42-49 (Roy F. Baumeister 
& Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004). See generally James J. Gross, The Emerging Field of Emo-
tion Regulation: An Integrative Review, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 271 (1998). 
212. Batja Mesquita, Emotions as Dynamic Cultural Phenomena, in HANDBOOK OF 
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 6, at 871, 871. 
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people learn emotional responses to different stimuli, physical 
symptoms associated with a given emotional response, and to in-
terpret others' emotions through a culturally defined lens.213 
They learn "proper" and "improper" emotional behaviors-and to 
interpret the propriety of different emotions-through emotional 
rules or scripts that create paradigmatic responses to particular 
stimuli.214 These scripts are often transmitted and reinforced 
through popular culture and archetypal narratives. For example, 
Romeo and Juliet-a story that is retold, in one form or another, 
throughout American popular culture-tells people the way ro-
mantic love is supposed to feel.215 
Not surprisingly, emotional responses to different stimuli vary 
across cultures.216 Non-western cultures, for instance, care more 
about maintaining relationships and engaging with people than 
their American counterparts.217 Americans are also more likely to 
feel anger in response to injustice than the Japanese.218 Other 
studies have documented culturally specific manifestations of 
emotional behavior, including facial and vocal expression.219 
Emotional scripts maintain their relevance even in the face of 
evidence that the scripts do not accurately describe emotional re-
ality. For example, we express sadness at funerals even if we are 
downright hostile toward the decedent; we express joy at wed-
dings even if we have doubts about the merits of the union; we 
express pride in our country by standing during the national an-
them even when our collective actions provoke shame; we express 
disgust at certain sexual practices even when we engage in them. 
While internal and external forces operate to stabilize emo-
tions, conscious reasoning is far from perfect as a model for stabil-
ity. Indeed, it can potentially destabilize perception and judg-
ment. When individuals are asked to explain the reasons behind 
their attitudes, they are more likely to be dissatisfied with their 
213. Cheshire Calhoun, Making up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 119, at 217, 220. 
214. Id. at 220; ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZA-
TION OF HUMAN FEELING 56, 58, 59, 74 (1983). 
215. Calhoun, supra note 213, at 221. 
216. Mesquita, supra note 212, at 871. 
217. See id. at 876. 
218. Id. at 875. 
219. NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 62, 68 (1986). 
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choice,220 change their attitudes,221 and display lower consistency 
between the attitude and subsequent behavior.222 These dynam-
ics are particularly relevant under conditions of limited know-
ledge about the attitude object.223 Indeed, when the choice under 
consideration is particularly complex, conscious deliberative con-
sideration can actually lead to objectively less optimal outcomes 
when compared with choices made with minimal deliberation.224 
C. Emotions, Attitudes, and Interpretation 
The underlying meaning of constitutional commitments is often 
ambiguous. More than other legal commitment devices-statutes, 
regulations, bank notes, or commercial contracts-the Constitu-
tion's vague language and age, as well as the absence of consen-
sus about appropriate interpretive methodology, leaves open a 
wide range of plausible interpretations. 
Given a text that is subject to multiple interpretations, how do 
individuals construct the precise meaning of constitutional com-
mitments? How do individuals determine, for example, whether 
the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause encompasses a woman's decision to terminate a pregnan-
cy? 
The dominant view has long treated interpretation as a process 
dominated by reason. Under this view, rational inference, 
precedent, and logic provide the ideal model for constructing con-
stitutional meaning.225 This, in turn, facilitates the need for ex-
220. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice 
Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331, 331 (1993). 
221. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspection, Attitude, Change, and Attitude-Behavior 
Consistency: The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Why We Feel the Way We Do, in 22 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 287, 288-89 (Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 
1989). 
222. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Effects of Analyzing Reasons on Attitude-Behavior Con-
sistency, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 13 (1984). 
223. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Attitudes: The 
Moderating Effect of Knowledge About the Attitude Object, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 379, 396, 398 (1989). 
224. See Ap Dijksterhuis et al., On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-Without-
Attention Effect, 311 SCI. 1005, 1005, 1007 (2006); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. 
Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and 
Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 191 (1991). 
225. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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pert judgment in determining what the Constitution means. And 
for expertise in rational judgment, we turn to judges. 
Regardless of whether emotion is seen as a constructive or de-
structive force, emotion is an inevitable, and often controlling, 
dynamic in the way that individuals interpret the Constitution. 
Rather than following a rational process of logical inference, their 
interpretive faculties are guided by emotion and intuition. Thus, 
to the extent that (1) constitutional meaning is constructed by a 
mix of judicial and non-judicial actors, or (2) judicial decision 
making mirrors the way lay people make decisions about consti-
tutional meaning, emotion is an inevitable element in the way so-
ciety determines the content and meaning of constitutional com-
mitments. 
1. Emotions and Constitutional Attitudes 
In considering how individuals perceive constitutional com-
mitments, there is one overriding reality: most individuals con-
front constitutional commitments with extremely limited infor-
mation about the constitutional text,226 political institutions like 
the Supreme Court,227 or the issues themselves.228 Moreover, in 
an environment where attention to politics is in short supply,229 
constitutionally significant issues like abortion, same-sex mar-
riage, and flag burning are fairly low on the public's list of priori-
ties.230 
As a result, members of the public often have little incentive to 
seek out additional information about the issues that obsessively 
occupy constitutional scholars. Moreover, the emotionally charged 
nature of many issues may cause the public to avoid engaging in 
226. See MICHAEL x. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 70-71 & tbl. 2.2 (1996); Michael C. Dorf, Whose Constitu-
tion Is It Anyway? What Americans Don't Know About Our Constitution-and Why It Mat-
ters, FINDLAW, May 21, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020529.html. 
227. Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the 
True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 919-20 (2005). 
228. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New 
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1308 
tbl. l (2004). 
229. See Gewirtzman, supra note 227, at 917 (providing data suggesting a declina in 
political interest over the past 30 years). 
230. See Frederic Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's 
Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24 (2006). 
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deliberation or debate about these issues out of a widespread dis-
taste for public conflict and concern over violating social 
norms.231 
Yet, even in a conflict-averse environment of limited interest, 
information, and engagement, individuals develop attitudes to-
ward particular people, events, and political issues.232 Attitudes 
are "the positive or negative judgment of an attitude object (i.e., 
the entity about which one bears an attitude)."233 Attitudinal 
responses are divided into three different categories: affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral.234 The affective component consists of 
the emotions and feelings triggered by the attitude object, the 
cognitive component corresponds to the ''beliefs" elicited, and the 
behavioral component includes the actions or predispositions to 
act toward the attitude object.235 
The notion that attitudes have affective and cognitive compo-
nents finds reinforcement in dual-process theory.236 The dual-
process theory refers to models of human psychology that posit 
the existence of two simultaneous, and often interdependent, op-
erating systems that help people define their relationship to the 
world around them and assist their brains in processing informa-
tion.237 
231. See Carolyn L. Funk, Process Performance: Public Reaction to Legislative Policy 
Debate, in WHAT Is IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 193, 195, 198, 200--
01 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001); JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH 
THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD WORK 134-35 (2002). 
232. But see John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Responses: 
Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences, 36 AM. J. POL. Ser. 579, 579 (1992) 
(stating that citizens do not possess specific attitudes, but "a mix of only partially consis-
tent ideas and considerations"). 
233. SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 216 
(2004). 
234. Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 269, 271 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds. 4th ed. 1998); 
ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 14 (1993). 
235. FISKE, supra note 233, at 216. 
236. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 
102 (2000). 
237. See Steven J. Breckler & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Affect Versus Evaluation in the 
Structure of Attitudes, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 253, 269 (1989) (concluding that af-
fect and evaluation form distinct components of individual attitudes); Sunstein, supra note 
25, at 533. See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken 
& Yaakov Trope eds., 1999). 
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The first system, referred to as the rational, cognitive, or cool 
system, operates in the realm of beliefs-a set of true-false infe-
rences that involve associations between an object and another 
concept.238 For example, upon confronting a chocolate sundae, in-
dividuals associate "sundae" with the concept of "has calories."239 
This system operates primarily in the realm of conscious thought 
and is seen as "emotionally neutral, contemplative, ... slow, epi-
sodic, and strategic."240 
The second system, referred to as associative emotional, expe-
riential, or hot, operates in the realm of feelings-a set of mes-
sages that define whether individuals want to approach or avoid 
a particular object.241 It is primarily intuitive, often unconscious, 
and focused on gut reactions.242 This system operates to help eva-
luate both the direction of attitudes-the "how do I feel about it 
question," or as social psychologists put it, valence-and the level 
of strength or intensity associated with a given attitude.243 
While the brain relies on these two parallel systems to process 
information, the two systems do not necessarily operate on the 
same timeline. The brain is constructed in ways that give emo-
tional reactions an advantage over cognitive processing, a proba-
ble effect of the emotional system's evolutionary function of enabl-
ing quick and efficient fight-or-flight decision making.244 As 
Joseph LeDoux notes, information transmitted through neural 
pathways that control intuitive response arrives faster than in-
formation processed through cognitive pathways.245 This intui-
tive reaction, in turn, affects the way people receive information 
through the slower cognitive system.246 As a result, people often 
238. Lee et al., supra note 204, at 4. 
239. See Roger Giner-Sorolla, Affect in Attitude, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 237, at 441, 443. 
240. Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System of Delay of Gratification: 
Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 3 (1999). 
241. Lee et al., supra note 204, at 4. 
242. See Seymour Epstein et al., Individual Differences in Intuitive-Experiential and 
Analytical-Rational Thinking Styles, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 390, 391 (1996). 
243. See Michel Tuan Pham, The Logic of Feeling, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 360, 362 (2004). 
244. Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advanta-
geous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293, 1294 (1997). 
245. See LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 163. 
246. BRADER, supra note 13, at 56; Joseph E. LeDoux & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Emotional 
Networks in the Brain, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 159, 161 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2008). 
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react before they have time to think, and their thoughts are co-
lored by their affective reactions to particular stimuli, including 
political issues and leaders.247 
Not surprisingly, "affective processes predominate" in the for-
mation of individual attitudes, particularly when compared with 
cognition.248 For example, the affective reactions people have to 
political candidates or particular social policies more strongly 
predict how they ultimately evaluate those candidates and poli-
cies than their cognitive reactions.249 In a comprehensive survey 
of the literature, Jack Glaser and Peter Salovey conclude that 
"[a]ffective reactions play a major, if not the dominant role in 
candidate selection."250 
Feelings function as an important source of information in eva-
luating an attitude object. As a result, citizens will often consult 
their emotional reactions toward a particular candidate when as-
sessing the candidate's overall desirability as a potential leader. 
In a landmark 1982 study, the results of which have been consis-
tently upheld in the years since, Robert Abelson and his col-
leagues concluded that the emotions voters have toward particu-
lar candidates, like happiness or anger, better predict actual 
voting behavior than opinions about the candidates' honesty or 
competence.251 For these reasons, psychologist and political con-
sultant Drew Westen attributes much of the Democratic Party's 
pre-Obama political difficulties to a systemic "undervaluation of 
emotion," and urges candidates to adopt a renewed strategic focus 
on "clear, emotionally compelling appeals."252 
247. See Milton Lodge & Charles S. Taber, The Automaticity of Affect for Political 
Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 26 
POL. PSYCHOL. 455, 455 (2005). 
248. FISKE, supra note 233, at 225; see also Linda A. Jackson et al., Cognition, Affect, 
and Behavior in the Prediction of Group Attitudes, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 306, 313-14 (1996); Howard Lavine et al., On the Primacy of Affect in the Determi· 
nation of Attitudes and Behavior: The Moderating Role of Affective-Cognitive Ambivalence, 
34 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 398, 398 (1998) (finding that affect exerted a 
stronger influence on political attitudes in situations where the affective and cognitive 
components of attitude conflict). 
249. Eagly & Chaiken, supra note 234, at 278; see Kinder, supra note 6, at 307. 
250. Jack Glaser & Peter Salovey, Affect in Electoral Politics, 2 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 156, 159 (1998). 
251. Abelson et al., supra note 193, at 626; see WESTEN, supra note 13, at 118-19 (stat-
ing that the results of the Abelson study have held up in the twenty-five years since). 
252. WESTEN, supra note 13, at 43-44. 
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Emotion's influence is particularly strong in situations where 
individuals have limited information upon which to form be-
liefs253 or allocate limited attention to the choice at hand.254 This 
makes the emotions triggered by a given object more like to shape 
individual attitudes toward that object. In other words, while 
people may not know or have enough information to determine 
what they think about a given issue, almost everyone has a feel-
ing about it.255 
But emotion's interpretive influence may not be limited to the 
ignorant or apathetic. In a recent study, political scientist Ted 
Brader challenged the conventional wisdom that only less sophis-
ticated citizens are driven by emotion. Brader conducted an expe-
riment that exposed citizens with varying levels of political know-
ledge to political advertisements designed to trigger enthusiasm 
or fear in the viewer.256 He concluded, on balance, that politically 
sophisticated citizens who saw politics as relevant were more res-
ponsive to, and influenced by, emotional cues.257 Hence, even po-
litically knowledgeable citizens who show relatively high interest 
in politics are subject to emotion's influence over their attitudes. 
As with attitudes toward political candidates, emotion plays a 
critical role in attitude development for a range of constitutional-
ly salient issues.258 In a 1998 study, Geoffrey Haddock and Mark 
Zanna sought to explore the underlying structure of attitudes to-
253. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Feelings and Phenominal Experiences, in 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES (Arie W. Krughansh & E. Troy 
Higgin eds., 2007); Wendy M. Rahn, Affect as Information: The Role of Public Mood in Po· 
litical Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF 
RATIONALITY 130, 130-31, 150 (Arthur Lupia et al., eds., 2000) (discussing study showing 
that "public mood" has a greater impact on opinions among individuals with low political 
information); Kari Edwards, The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation 
and Change, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 202 (1990) ("[A]ffective cues are 
particularly potent determinants of attitude change when the ability or motivation to 
process issue-relevant information is low."); see also Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Af-
fect, Generalization, and the Perception of Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 20, 
20, 30 (1983). 
254. Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of 
Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 288 (1999) 
(presenting findings showing that when information processing resources are limited, con-
sumer choice is more likely influenced by affective reactions than cognitions). 
255. See Kinder, supra note 6, at 295. 
256. BRADER, supra note 13, at 99. 
257. Id. 
258. See Alice H. Eagly et al., Cognitive and Affective Bases of Attitudes Toward Social 
Groups and Social Policies, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 133 (1994) (offering a 
"general endorsement of the position that affect can underlie attitudes"). 
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ward the death penalty, with specific attention to the roles that 
affect and cognition play in predicting attitudes.259 They con-
cluded that emotional responses were "predictive of attitudes," 
and that affect plays a critical role in attitude formation around 
the death penalty.260 This conclusion echoes other research sug-
gesting that emotional reactions were better predictors of indi-
vidual attitudes about sexual morality than rational assessments 
about the harmfulness of the conduct.261 Moreover, emotional 
responses play a significant role in predicting attitudes toward 
abortion,262 affirmative action,263 different social groups,264 the 
Clinton impeachment,265 the outcome of Bush v. Gore,266 and the 
torture at Abu Ghraib prison.267 
Hence, even under conditions of what Bruce Ackerman calls 
"normal politics"-periods of widespread detachment and disen-
gagement268--there are still emotions and feelings that actively 
steer the course of constitutional culture.269 
2. Emotions and Moral Judgment 
As constitutional scholar Paul Brest once noted, the "most sig-
nificant issues of public morality are, or once were, or eventually 
will be, constitutional issues."270 Indeed, in a society where li-
mited government and equality remain core elements of constitu-
259. Geoffrey Haddock & Mark P. Zanna, Assessing the Impact of Affective and Cogni-
tive Information in Predicting Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, 22 L. & HUMAN 
BEHAV. 325, 326 (1998). 
260. Id. at 337. 
261. Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emo-
tions of Conservatives & Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 191, 214-15 (2001). 
262. Haddock & Zanna, supra note 259, at 328. 
263. Id. 
264. Victoria M. Esses et al., Values, Stereotypes, and Emotions as Determinants of In-
tergroup Attitudes, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE PROCESSES IN 
GROUP PERCEPTION 137, 141 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993); see also 
Jamie Chamberlin, What's Behind Prejudice?, 34 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 34, 34 (summa-
rizing research on emotion and prejudice). 
265. WESTEN, supra note 13, at 103, 107-08. 
266. Id. at 103-04, 109-10. 
267. Id. at 103, 110-11. 
268. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 230-31 (1991). 
269. Kinder, supra note 6, at 281. 
270. Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 178 (1986). But 
see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 141 (1999) (ar-
guing that moral philosophy is irrelevant to constitutional law). 
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tional and cultural identity271 where religion remains a wide-
spread presence in social life and public discourse, and where the 
constitutional text frames the relevant law at a high level of ab-
straction,272 a moral element is likely to lurk, explicitly or latent-
ly, behind virtually every major constitutional dispute.273 It is 
nearly impossible to discuss the issues at the heart of contempo-
rary constitutional discourse-like abortion, homosexuality, the 
right to die, or affirmative action-without implicating moral 
judgment.274 
Traditionally, emotion has been seen as destructive to these 
sorts of moral evaluations and decisions.275 Those critical of emo-
tion's role in moral decision making see emotion as partisan-it 
causes people to "play favorites"-and, therefore, detrimental to 
the impartial state from which ideal moral judgments should 
spring.276 Others see emotion as arbitrary, arising from factors 
external to the situation that can flood consciousness and distort 
judgment.277 Finally, some fear emotions automaticity-the in-
tuitive characteristics that lie beyond the realm of voluntary con-
trol and defy the deliberate exercise of free will and conscious 
moral reasoning.278 
For many years, academic psychologists echoed and reinforced 
these concerns in their study of moral judgment. Traditional 
models of moral development and reasoning focused entirely on 
cognition and conscious processes and dismissed the potential for 
emotion to contribute positively to the moral domain.279 This 
school of thought draws its origins from Plato and Immanuel 
271. See Donald R. Kinder, Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics, in 2 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778, 809-11 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 
1998). 
272. Brest, supra note 270, at 178-79. 
273. See id.; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 56-57 (2006) (arguing con-
stitutional interpretation "require[s] a very considerable 'excursion' into political morali-
ty''). For a more extensive descriptive and normative elaboration of this view, see generally 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1996). 
274. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 6-8 (1984). 
275. David Pizarro, Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judg-
ment, 30 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 355, 355 (2000). 
276. Id. at 356. 
277. Id. at 357. 
278. Id. at 357-58. 
279. See id. at 356. 
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Kant,280 but found its most recent and influential incarnation 
from Lawrence Kohlberg, a leader in the "cognitive revolution" 
that overtook psychology in the 1960s.281 
This rationalist perspective views moral judgment as primarily 
cognitive in nature. Decisions about morality or ethics involve 
conscious thinking, can be evaluated from a true-false perspec-
tive, and move toward a set of answers that are universal and 
known.282 People develop moral competence over time and in 
stages of cognitive development beginning in childhood.283 It oc-
curs as individuals cultivate a particular set of aptitudes that as-
sist with moral reasoning284-like putting one's self in another 
person's shoes"-or by creating environmental circumstances that 
facilitate moral development.285 At their highest stage of moral 
development, individuals can make morally sound decisions that 
replicate rule-of-law values through invoking "self-chosen ethical 
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, 
and consistency."286 
Today, emotion's role in moral judgment is undergoing a dra-
matic rehabilitation. Emotion is increasingly seen as an essential 
and unavoidable component of moral assessment. More impor-
tantly, its presence can, and often does, constructively facilitate 
the resolution of issues with a moral component.287 The notion 
that emotion is indispensable to moral judgment finds support in 
at least two areas of research: (1) social psychology research on 
the integration of affective and intuitive forces in moral judgment 
and (2) neuroscience research isolating portions of the brain asso-
ciated with emotion processing that are active during moral 
judgment tasks. First, Kohlberg's rationalist perspective on moral 
reasoning has come under significant fire from Virginia psycholo-
gist Jonathan Haidt, who offers an alternative perspective on 
280. Id. 
281. Richard A. Shweder & Jonathan Haidt, The Future of Moral Psychology: Truth, 
Intuition, and the Pluralist Way, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 360, 360 (1993). 
282. Haidt, supra note 134, at 818. 
283. Id. at 816. 
284. Id. 
285. See id. 
286. Brest, supra note 270, at 176 (quoting LAWRENCE KOHBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 19 (1981)). 
287. See Brennan, supra note 117, at 3 (exposing this view in the context of constitu-
tional interpretation). 
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moral judgment: social intuitionism.288 According to Haidt, moral 
judgments are made at a sub-conscious level and take the form of 
gut reactions rather than conscious, deliberative reasoning.289 
These intuitions occur "quickly, effortlessly, and automatical-
ly"290 and contain a normative judgment about whether the con-
duct or object under evaluation is good or bad.291 To support his 
theory, Haidt conducted a set of experiments where he presented 
participants with different scenarios involving sexual morality.292 
The studies concluded that participants' emotional reactions to 
the scenarios better predicted their moral attitudes than did a 
more conscious, cognitive assessment about whether the conduct 
was actually harmful to anyone.293 
Conscious, deliberative reasoning plays a role in this model 
primarily, though not exclusively, to provide a post-hoc rationali-
zation of an intuitive judgment: the emotional dog wagging its ra-
tional tail.294 While Haidt recognizes the potential for sheer logic 
or private reflection to overcome intuitive judgment, he argues 
that this rarely happens in practice.295 Instead, individuals are 
far more receptive to social persuasion-group moral norms that 
emerge from friends and others in social interactions where other 
people exert a moral judgment but do not provide any reasoned 
persuasion or articulated rationale.296 
There is also evidence of a relationship between certain emo-
tional capacities, like an ability to discriminate between different 
feelings or regulate emotions, and the resolution of moral dilem-
mas. In one study, individuals were presented with the "Asian 
disease problem," a decision-making scenario involving a choice 
between a certain outcome or an outcome that involves risk.297 
288. See Haidt, supra note 134, at 814. 
289. See id. at 819-20. For an argument that moral intuitions have an evolutionary 
basis, see Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 V AND. L. 
REV. 1633, 1639-54 (2007). 
290. Haidt, supra note 136, at 818. 
291. Id. at 819-20. 
292. Haidt & Hersh, supra note 261, at 193. 
293. Id. at 214; see also Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture and Morality, or Is It 
Wrong To Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 613, 626 (1993) (concluding 
that the role of affect in moral judgment may be variable across cultures). 
294. Haidt, supra note 134, at 822-23. 
295. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro 
and Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197, 197 (2003). 
296. Haidt, supra note 134, at 828-29. 
297. See Pablo Fernandez-Berrocal & Natalio Extremera, About Emotional Intelligence 
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The study concluded that individuals with a higher self-reported 
ability to regulate emotions were more likely to select the risk-
seeking option.298 A similar study showed a relationship between 
the ability to identify different emotions or moods and the choices 
made when presented with a moral dilemma involving the deci-
sion to divorce.299 Both studies suggest that moral decision mak-
ing is sensitive to emotional dynamics and that different emo-
tional capacities influence moral outcomes.300 
Second, there is increasing neurobiological evidence that "emo-
tion is a significant driving force in moral judgment."301 Neuros-
cientists have become fairly adept at identifying the regions of the 
brain involved in certain types of decision making.302 They have 
found significant evidence of increased activity in brain regions 
associated with emotion when individuals are confronted with 
certain types of moral judgments.303 
In a recent neurobiology study using fMRI data, Joshua Greene 
and his colleagues measured brain activity in individuals pre-
sented with moral and non-moral dilemmas.304 They concluded 
that differences in a person's level of emotional engagement im-
pacted moral judgment.305 To support their findings, the experi-
ments concluded that there was a relationship between the choic-
es made and neural activity located in emotional centers of the 
brain.306 
Moreover, in another study, patients with damage to the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (''VMPC"), a brain region necessary to 
generate emotions, more likely adopted a utilitarian approach to 
moral judgment.307 The authors of the study attributed this shift 
and Moral Decisions, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Ser. 548, 548 (2005). 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. at 548-49; see also Blumenthal, supra note 74, at 7-8 (concluding that people 
superficially process information when they are in a good mood). 
301. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 
6 TRENDS COGNITIVE Ser. 517, 522 (2002). 
302. Robinson et al., supra note 289, at 1660. 
303. Id. 
304. See Joshua D. Greene et al., An {MRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment, 293 Ser. 2105, 2105 (2001). 
305. Id. at 2107. 
306. Id. 
307. Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian 
Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908, 908, 910 (2007). 
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in perspective to the diminished role of "social emotions," like 
compassion, shame, and guilt, in patients with VMPC damage.308 
Both studies provide support for a neurobiological connection be-
tween emotion and moral judgment.309 
D. Dualism and the Link Between Emotion and Reason 
The dominant view rigidly separates emotion and reason and 
places the two forces in tension with one another.310 Indeed, one 
of reason's primary benefits is its ability to allow individuals to 
discard emotional forces from the decision-making calculus alto-
gether. This dualism informs the American cultural model for 
judicial behavior, which seeks to minimize emotion's influence 
and delegitimizes its role in constitutional interpretation.311 
To the extent that society views reason as a desirable element 
in the interpretive process, evidence increasingly shows that emo-
tion is essential to the successful exercise of reason. This evidence 
calls into question the dominant view's dualistic model, which se-
parates reason from emotion and views emotion as a threat to the 
exercise of our rational faculties. 
From the vantage point of neuroscience, reason and emotion 
can and do coexist, minimizing concerns over emotion's ability to 
displace reason. As neuroscientists began to delve deeper into the 
relationship between brain activity and affective-cognitive re-
sponse,312 they revealed a human decision-making process in 
which emotion and reason are deeply interrelated, with "certain 
aspects of the process of emotion and feeling" considered "indis-
pensable for rationality."313 
Antonio Damasio's studies of brain-injured patients have been 
extremely influential in this area. Damasio's work focused on in-
308. Id. 
309. Robinson et al., supra note 289, at 1659-60. 
310. See Sheila T. Murphy & R.B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective 
Priming with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 723, 736 (1993). 
311. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text. 
312. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at xiv; see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternal-
ism, 35 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2007). 
313. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at xiii. The precise extent of the interrelationship and 
causal relationship between the two spheres is a matter of great dispute and active in· 
quiry. See Blumenthal, supra note 311, at 18-24. 
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dividuals with injuries to portions of their brain that process 
emotion.314 Predictably, these patients experienced a lack of af-
fect and emotional reaction.315 The patients' reasoning and logi-
cal abilities remained perfectly intact, and they performed nor-
mally on intelligence tests.316 Nonetheless, the patients 
experienced severe impairments in their ability to make basic de-
cisions, categorize, or engage in long-term planning.317 
Individuals rely on subjective affective responses to prioritize 
among, or direct their attention to, particular attributes of com-
peting stimuli,318 provide valuable information,319 and integrate 
that information into attitude formation, judgment, and decision 
making.320 Indeed, an individual's feelings deeply impact the 
process by which that person will assess risk,321 determine cau-
sality,322 and assign value to outcomes,323 all components of tra-
ditional rational analysis. Reason, in turn, often operates to con-
trol emotional reaction. Efforts to reframe a problem, 
intellectualize an emotionally volatile situation, or reappraise 
emotionally disturbing phenomena are all cognition-driven efforts 
to alter, minimize, or regulate emotional response.324 All of this 
suggests that "emotion is part of rationality itself, and that the 
two are intimately intertwined and interconnected processes."325 
314. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at 32-34. 
315. Id. at 34. 
316. See id. at 32-37. 
317. See id. at 36-37. 
318. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 1404-05. 
319. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of 
Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 513, 520 (1983) (showing that individuals use "momentary moods to make 
judgments about their general happiness and life satisfaction"). 
320. Schwarz & Clore, supra note 253, at 434; see Richard A. Posner, The Role of the 
Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1063 (2006). 
321. Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 146, 147 (2001); Slovic, supra note 158, at 694. 
322. See Pham et al., supra note 200, at 168. 
323. Christopher K. Hsee & Yuval Rottenstreich, Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the 
Affective Psychology of Value, 133 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 23, 27 (2004); Samuel M. 
McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Re-
wards, 306 SCI. 503, 506 (2004) (suggesting that bias in favor of immediately available 
rewards is connected to activity in portions of the brain that process emotions). 
324. See Gross, supra note 211, at 284-85. 
325. McDermott, supra note 164, at 693; see also Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 6, 
at 634 ("If expected emotions captured everything that people care about, then the absence 
of immediate emotional influences would not degrade decisions as much as it does."). 
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E. Emotion and Constitutional Commitment 
To sum up thus far, constitutional governance facilitates com-
mitment over time, and with it, the substantial benefits asso-
ciated with individual and collective consistency. Emotion, de-
rided by the framers for its potential to destabilize, operates 
instead as a vital stabilizing force that enables prior commit-
ments to survive and thrive. In particular, emotion facilitates ha-
bitual behavior, helps monitor adherence to commitments 
through enthusiasm and anxiety, and stabilizes individual beha-
vior and political preferences within a large and heterogeneous 
constitutional culture. Further, emotion is a critical influence on 
the interpretation of existing constitutional commitments, as well 
as the exercise of reason and rationality. 
IV. IMAGINATION 
As with commitment, emotion is indispensable to imagina-
tion.326 In particular, emotion (1) identifies which commitments 
to revisit through the processes of attention, appraisal, and as-
sessment; (2) facilitates a change in attitude towards prior com-
mitments as a result of anxiety; and (3) enables social movements 
to initiate a process of commitment revision and renewal through 
action tendencies associated with particular emotions. 
A. Attention, Appraisal, and Assessment 
Imagination encourages individuals to revisit and reconsider 
prior commitments in light of other commitments, changed cir-
cumstances, or new information. Despite its potential to distract, 
emotion enables individuals to focus on which commitments to 
revisit through three processes that are critical to human func-
tioning: attention, appraisal, and assessment.327 
First, emotion grabs and focuses attention.328 In a political and 
social environment with multiple stimuli, it is impossible to focus 
on everything at once. Emotion helps focus cognitive faculties on 
326. For an early articulation of the connection between emotion and imagination, see 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 220 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton 
eds., 2000). 
327. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 1404-06. 
328. Id. at 1404. 
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areas of personal importance and public concern329 and sends a 
warning signal to revisit prior choices.330 As emotion theorist Ro-
nald de Sousa points out, "No logic determines salience: what to 
notice, what to attend to, what to inquire about."331 It is an emo-
tional reaction--0ften intuitive and lurking beneath conscious-
ness332-that operates as a tractor beam for cognitive efforts and 
helps to "facilitate efficient judgment and decision making."333 
Moreover, emotion assists decision making by focusing atten-
tion on a limited range of potentially available alternatives. Da-
masio argues that the human brain attaches a "somatic marker" 
to certain potential outcomes, which often takes the form of a gut 
reaction to a particular choice.334 These markers are often emo-
tional in nature and assist individuals in making efficient choices 
by sending emotional signals that quickly constrain the range of 
available alternatives.335 This, in turn, allows individuals to focus 
cognitive faculties on the limited range of options most closely re-
lated to the individuals' overall goal(s).336 
Emotion also focuses people's attention on particular aspects of 
stimuli that initiate behavioral evolution and change. Empathy, 
for example, focuses people's attention on the possibility of dis-
tress and can facilitate cooperative and helping behavior.337 En-
thusiasm increases attention to political campaigns and sets in 
motion the desire to get actively involved in the democratic 
process.338 
329. Marc D. Lewis, Bridging Emotion Theory and Neurobiology Through Dynamic 
Systems Modeling, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 169, 171 (2005); George F. Loewenstein et al., 
Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 267, 268 (2001). 
330. See D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 67 (1997). 
331. RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 191 (1987). 
332. LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing physiological triggers for fear that pre-
cede cognitive awareness); Jon Elster, Rationality and the Emotions, 106 ECON. J. 1386, 
1393 (1996). 
333. Melissa L. Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect 
and Reason, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 327, 347 
(Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003). 
334. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at 173. 
335. Id. 
336. See id. But see Wilson & Schooler, supra note 224, at 191 (arguing that thinking 
may actually draw attention to irrelevant information). 
337. Pizarro, supra note 275, at 360. 
338. BRADER, supra note 13, at 126; MARCUS, supra note 13, at 89-91; Nicholas A. Va-
lentino et al., Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen? Emotions, Political Information Seek-
ing, and Learning via the Internet, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 247, 265-66 (2008). 
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Second, emotion is also critical to appraisal-the process by 
which meaning is assigned to an event based upon the event's re-
lationship to an individual's overall goals and well-being.339 
When individuals decide to change an existing commitment, they 
must first appraise how other existing commitments, and how 
any potential new commitments, align with their personal and 
collective goals. Emotions convey information about the things an 
individual values;340 sadness and anger, for example, are usually 
connected to something one cares about. As a result, the presence 
and strength of different emotions enable individuals to gauge the 
effectiveness of existing commitments and prioritize among com-
peting commitments and values, a necessary task in virtually 
every constitutional conflict. People often look to their feelings to 
find out what they care about most and to provide information 
about whether a proposed commitment will satisfy or fail to satis-
fy a particular goal.341 
Third, imagination demands that individuals assess the emo-
tional outcomes produced by potential changes. Here too, emotion 
drives the process by which individuals envision and evaluate the 
future. Most importantly, people make choices based on how they 
think they will feel once a given decision is made. In the words of 
psychologist Daniel Gilbert, the brain allows individuals to "pre-
feel events."342 People simulate future events in their imagina-
tions and evaluate their emotional reactions to imagined futures. 
This process allows individuals to predict their future emotions 
with greater accuracy and to make choices to maximize future sa-
tisfaction.343 
This "affective forecasting" process is, to some degree, 
flawed.344 People unconsciously supply and omit relevant infor-
mation in systematic and predictable ways that distort their pre-
dictive powers. In other words, they rely too much on their feel-
339. Maroney, supra note 7, at 1405. 
340. Gerald L. Clore et al., Affective Causes and Consequences of Social Information 
Processing, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 323, 384-85 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & 
Thomas K. Srum eds., 2d ed. 1994); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE 
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 30 (2001). 
341. Schwarz & Clore, supra note 253, at 437. 
342. GILBERT, supra note 10, at 120. 
343. Id. 
344. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Bedonie Adaptation, 
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 769-71 (2007); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the 
Emotions: The Problem of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 162-63 (2005). 
2009] OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS 673 
ings about the present in assessing their future feelings and fail 
to fully account for their emotional adaptability to changed cir-
cumstances.345 
Despite these predictive errors, emotion, from a purely descrip-
tive perspective, helps quantify the expected utility associated 
with particular options for change. When people imagine the fu-
ture, they do not simply contemplate rational, bottom-line out-
comes. Instead, they engage in a complex, predictive process that 
focuses on how their emotional state will change in response to 
different outcomes. Then, they make choices based upon that 
predictive assessment. 
B. Anxiety and Attitude Change 
Emotion offers the potential for intransigence and self-
involvement. Emotional states sometimes make it difficult for in-
dividuals to listen to alternative perspectives and obtain the ben-
efits associated with reasoned deliberation and introspection.346 
As a result, people may not recognize situations where commit-
ments might prove destructive to their long-term self-interest, or 
adapt to changing circumstances.347 Significant empirical evi-
dence supports the proposition that strongly held attitudes are 
difficult to change and often go hand-in-hand with strong emo-
tions.348 
From this vantage point, emotion may also facilitate attitudes 
within constitutional culture, like intolerance, that are seemingly 
immune to reasoned argument and destructive to the survival of 
heterogeneous democratic societies.349 In particular, intolerance 
stems from perceptions that a particular group represents a 
345. GILBERT, supra note 10, at 224-28. 
346. See Michael Ignatieff, Getting Iraq Wrong: What the War Has Taught Me About 
Political Judgment, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, 26, 29. 
347. See id. 
348. See Richard E. Petty et al., Emotional Factors in Attitudes and Persuasion, in 
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, at supra note 6, at 752, 754; Allan P.O. Williams, et 
al., MANAGING CHANGE SUCCESSFULLY: USING THEORY AND EXPERIENCE TO IMPLEMENT 
CHANGE 307 (2002). 
349. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation 
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 734 (2000) (finding that 
amygdala responses to black and white faces in white subjects reflect cultural evaluations 
of social groups influenced by individual experience). 
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threat to an individual or that individual's group.350 These threat 
perceptions are often driven by emotions like anger and fear that 
can cause individuals to overestimate the actual threat or remain 
stubborn in the face of information about the actual nature of the 
threat.351 
Yet this is only part of the story. While emotion may facilitate 
intransigence,352 intolerance,353 and self-involvement,354 it is al-
so critical to the process of attitude change. Emotion enables in-
dividuals to break from the limitations presented by consistency 
and habit when circumstances warrant. For example, political 
scientists commonly accept that most voters operate according to 
habitual patterns and without much information about a given 
candidate's policy positions.355 Absent a reason to break from 
routine, voter behavior is best predicted by a set of partisan affil-
iations that form early in life, along with an assessment of the li-
keability of the candidate.356 Thus, for the most part, reasoned, 
well-informed, independent assessments of a candidate's policy 
positions simply do not take place. 
However, as political scientist George Marcus has shown, an-
xiety is critical in causing individuals to depart from prior habits 
and facilitating conscious deliberation.357 Absent anxiety, indi-
vidual political behavior is dominated by prior commitment and 
habit.358 But when voters operate under conditions of anxiety, 
something strange happens-they become more attentive to the 
actual positions taken by candidates, actively seek out new in-
formation, and show a willingness to act based on the new infor-
mation they obtain.359 In short, they behave as rational actors 
and are willing to reassess the wisdom of prior commitments and 
habits, but only under conditions triggered by an emotional re-
350. See Fiske, supra note 159, at 125, 127. 
351. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 194, at 105-09; id. at 124. 
352. See Ignatieff, supra note 346, at 29. 
353. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 194, at 222. 
354. See Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of Transient Drive 
States, 29 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159, 1165-67 (2003) (showing that indi-
vidual predictions of how others will react to emotional situations reflect participant pre-
dictions of how they themselves would react). 
355. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 102-03. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 103. 
358. Id. at 102-03. 
359. Id. at 103-04. 
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sponse.360 Hence, fear and anxiety help "to pry open the door to 
attitude change and unexpected choices."361 
Certain emotions also enable impartiality, a critical contextual 
tool to breaking habitual patterns. As political theorist Sharon 
Krause points out, impartiality involves perspective taking-the 
ability to see the world through someone else's eyes.362 This sort 
of imagination requires emotion: the empathy needed to adopt 
another's perspective and the emotional sensitivity required to 
understand the pain of discrimination or the pleasure of integra-
tion within a community.363 
C. Emotion and Constitutional Innovation 
Changes to a constitutional system, both within and outside 
the constraints of Article V, require the intersection of imagina-
tion and the necessary energy and resources for sustained politi-
cal action. The passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,364 the Su-
preme Court's decision to overrule Plessy u. Ferguson,365 and the 
path of the Court's abortion jurisprudence since Roe u. Wade366--
to name just a few critical moments of constitutional change- all 
aligned with the rise of social and political movements. Emotion 
fuels these social movements and is necessary to sustain individ-
ual and collective desire for public action.367 Absent the presence 
360. See id. 
361. BRADER, supra note 13, at 143. 
362. Sharon R. Krause, Assoc. Prof., Brown University, Public Deliberation and the 
Feeling of Impartiality 14 (Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2006). 
363. See id. at 14-17; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 340, at 444-45 (arguing that em-
pathy and compassion are necessary for judges and jurors to fully assess the facts before 
them); Deborah A. Small & Jennifer S. Lerner, Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and 
Anger Shape Judgments About a Welfare Case, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 149, 164 (2008) (explain-
ing how defense attorneys instruct juries to view the case from the defendant's perspective 
to "achieve a more lenient sentence"). 
364. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Fe-
deralism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 968-69, 1034 (2002). 
365. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2072-89 (2002). 
366. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Consti-
tutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1397-1400 (2006). 
367. See Leonie Huddy & Anna H. Gunnthorsdottir, The Persuasive Effects of Emotive 
Visual Imagery: Superficial Manipulation or the Product of Passionate Reason?, 21 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 745, 766-67 (2000) (concluding that "[k]nowledgeable, involved participants 
reacted more strongly to arousing visual imagery and were much more likely to feel posi-
tive about an organization, agree with its goals, objectives, and arguments, and take ac-
tion on its behalf ... "). 
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of emotion, constitutional communities will fall victim to "apathy, 
immobility, and ultimately, disintegration."368 
Emotions are associated with particular action tendencies.369 
Fear, for example, creates a tendency to engage in "fight or flight" 
behavior;370 love initiates behaviors that nurture.371 These action 
tendencies associated with particular emotions motivate individ-
uals to become involved in public life,372 to instigate moral ac-
tion,373 to engage in acts of altruism,374 and most importantly, to 
change the status quo.375 For example, compassion, triggered by 
people's perception of suffering, changes the way they see their 
relationships with other people and enables altruistic beha-
vior.376 Shame, guilt, and pride motivate or deter social action,377 
and emotional benefits associated with collective identity help 
form the glue that holds social movements together.378 
In particular, one emotion-hope-is absolutely critical to im-
agination and action within a constitutional system. As Profes-
sors Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren point out, hope is deeply 
connected to an ongoing sense of the law's potential and possibili-
ty.379 It provides individuals and social movements with the per-
sistence, resourcefulness, and courage necessary to bring about 
368. HALL, supra note 12, at 4. 
369. Lewis, supra note 329, at 181; see Mesquita, supra note 211, at 876-78 (discussing 
the "action readiness" aspect of emotion). 
370. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 70-71. 
371. See Margaret S. Clark & Ian Brissette, Two Types of Relationship Closeness and 
Their Influence on People's Emotional Lives, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra 
note 6, at 824, 831-32. 
372. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional Arousal as a Source of Bounded Rationality, 38 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 136 (1999) ("[E]motions are a central part of the psychologi-
cal process of motivation (i.e., the process that activates and guides human behavior to-
ward particular ends) as they heighten the saliency of certain desires, wants, and out-
comes and thus energize people to pursue them."). 
373. Welch, supra note 330, at 67-68. 
374. KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM 234 (1996) (concluding that 
"[a]ltruistic behavior does not arise from the dominance of reason over the baser pas-
sions"); see MARCUS, supra note 13, at 21. 
375. See Welch, supra note 330, at 69. 
376. Dacher Keltner et al., Emotional Intuitions and Moral Play, 19 Soc. JUST. RES. 
208, 210 (2006). 
377. See PASSIONATE POLITICS, supra note 14, at 18-20. 
378. Id. at 21-22; James M. Jasper, The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive 
Emotions in and Around Social Movements, 13 Soc. FORUM 397, 415 (1998). 
379. Kathryn R. Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 97 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Mar. 2009) (manuscript at 5, on file with author). 
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the transformation of long-held commitments.380 Conversely, in 
the absence of hope, imagination becomes impossible. Not surpri-
singly, then, dictatorial and oppressive legal regimes often em-
ploy significant resources to eliminate hope within a population 
as a means for maintaining power. 
The link between emotion and action also plays a critical role 
in shifting strategy and tactics within constitutional culture. For 
example, the social mobilization and activism that followed the 
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick38l-and led to 
its overruling sixteen years later382-can be explained, in part, as 
a shift from an emotional discourse within the gay community 
that centered around shame to one focused on pride.383 
D. Emotion and Imagination 
Just as emotions enable commitment to take hold, they also 
enable individuals to look at their commitments with new and 
more discerning eyes. Through attention, appraisal, and assess-
ment; anxiety; and action tendencies, emotions steer the imagina-
tive process and fuel the action necessary to revise prior commit-
ments and imagine new ones. 
V. EMOTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
For too long, the dominant view has impaired our ability to test 
core assumptions about human behavior that informed America's 
constitutional design. The result has been a disconnect between a 
theoretical framework that views emotion as destructive to con-
stitutional governance and the actual social practice of constitu-
tionalism, where emotion advances core constitutional objectives 
of consistency and innovation. Now, in light of recent develop-
ments in affective science and political psychology, we are in a 
position to draw some conclusions about the actual role emotion 
plays within constitutional culture, and to tighten the link be-
tween theory and practice. 
380. Id. 
381. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
382. Deborah Gould, Rock the Boat, Don't Rock the Boat, Baby: Ambivalence and the 
Emergence of Militant AIDS Activism, in PASSIONATE POLITICS, supra note 14, at 135-36. 
383. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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First, emotion is an unavoidable force in constitutional law-
making-it is simply too central to commitment making, inter-
pretation, moral judgment, and attitude change to be systemati-
cally dismissed or ignored. If the subject matter of recent 
Harvard Law Review forewords are any indication, the central 
descriptive inquiry in contemporary constitutional theory is the 
relationship between "popular conceptions of constitutional law" 
and the Court.384 Emotion is a vital part of this developing story, 
particularly in an environment where low levels of political know-
ledge and interest inhibit meaningful cognitive input. Indeed, 
emotional responses may more accurately predict popular inter-
pretive preferences than indicia of public support for reason-
based arguments. 
Second, contrary to the dominant view, emotion can play a pos-
itive role in constitutional culture. This is not to say that emo-
tion's impact is always positive.385 Indeed, constitutional systems 
can and do serve to minimize emotion's capacity to distort deci-
sion making in ways that undermine constitutional values. But 
emotional influences aren't entirely negative, and emotion 
enables behavior that allows constitutional commitments to de-
velop, thrive, and evolve. As a result, theorists should question 
their tendency to discount automatically emotional perspectives 
within constitutional debate. Among other things, emotions con-
tain important information about larger value commitments and 
serve as a mechanism for preserving those value commitments in 
a dynamic and changing environment. 
Third, emotion performs a valuable stabilizing function within 
constitutional culture. Its connection to habitual behavior allows 
written commitments to manifest themselves in social practices, 
and its relationship to partisanship helps to create stable political 
alignments that allow for a measure of predictability within a 
large and diverse political system. Emotion is also critical to the 
maintenance of communal structures-like families-that are in-
strumental in reinforcing commitments across generations. 
Fourth, emotion enables constitutional innovation and change. 
It helps spur social movement action, facilitate individuals' abili-
384. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 32-35 (2005); Post, supra note 35, at 4-6, 8-9; Schauer, SU· 
pra note 230, at 5-8. 
385. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
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ty to prioritize among competing concerns, provide important in-
formation as they assess alternative options, and-through anxie-
ty-allows them to break from existing habits. 
Fifth, developments in affective science have the potential to 
advance ongoing descriptive and normative inquiries in constitu-
tional theory. This article's goal is fairly modest: to demonstrate 
the centrality of emotion to core behaviors within constitutional 
systems and to argue that emotion brings positive elements to 
constitutional culture. 
But the impact of these realizations is potentially much larger. 
In a number of areas, a revised conception of emotion may alter 
the way people think about constitutional law and theory. 
A. Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Supremacy 
Over the past several years, constitutional scholars have once 
again questioned whether constitutional interpretation is the ex-
clusive province of the judiciary and the extent to which interpre-
tation by ordinary citizens, or their elected representatives, is de-
sirable.386 In this debate over interpretive supremacy, a 
professionally trained judiciary has always had predictability and 
stability on its side, particularly when contrasted with an emo-
tional public.387 The overriding concern is that citizens' reliance 
on emotion can lead to interpretive choices that are either erratic 
or discount long-term constitutional values to satisfy short-term 
desires. 
On one level, this characterization is correct. Citizens are likely 
to place great reliance upon emotion and intuition in their efforts 
to figure out what the Constitution means. And because they may 
not have a lot of information about the Constitution to work with, 
they will likely rely on emotion and intuition to compensate. 
But citizens' reliance on emotion may actually enhance their 
interpretive capacity. Emotion will help stabilize interpretation 
over time by integrating preferences into habit and by providing a 
mechanism for implanting those values across generations. More-
386. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 101; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
387. See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 145, 152-53 (1999). 
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over, it is only under certain emotional contexts that citizens' 
more rational faculties take hold and cause them to revisit past 
commitments and assumptions. 
In addition, the emotional attachment to the Constitution as a 
symbol, like the Bible, will temper more extreme interpretations 
of constitutional meaning. While many Americans remain ill-
informed about the Constitution's specific content, they have an 
emotional bond with the document that sustains its legitimacy 
and lasting integrity. These symbolic emotional ties may help ex-
plain why, for example, so many Americans oppose same-sex 
marriage but are reluctant to support a formal amendment that 
would elevate their policy preferences into a national precom-
mitment.388 
As a result, if the primary concern behind the capacity of ordi-
nary citizens to make constitutional judgments is their suscepti-
bility to the erratic and immediate pull of emotional forces, that 
danger may be far less extreme than the dominant view suggests. 
Indeed, if emotion helps stabilize popular interpretive prefe-
rences, members of the public may have a far greater capacity for 
interpretive consistency than previously believed. 
B. The Court and Public Opinion 
Along with potentially enhancing interpretive capacity, emo-
tion may also operate as a limitation on the Court's influence over 
the public. Constitutional scholars have long been skeptical of the 
Court's ability to initiate meaningful social change.389 Some of 
the research on the sources of attitudes and the causes of attitude 
change helps explain why. 
Most notably, the basis for a particular attitude impacts an in-
dividual's capacity for attitude change. Affect-based attitudes-
attitudes formed when affective reaction precedes conscious 
thought-are more susceptible to persuasive efforts that appeal 
388. See Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel Persily & Kevin Wallsten, Gay Rights, in PUBLIC 
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234, 255 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & 
Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (summarizing public opinion data to conclude that "support for 
a constitutional amendment [banning same-sex marriage] is consistently lower than oppo-
sition to legalization of same-sex marriage."). 
389. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 1991). 
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to emotion rather than cognitive capacities.390 Further, affect-
based attitudes are held with greater confidence than attitudes 
based in cognition.391 
This suggests that the very nature of legal reasoning may inhi-
bit the Court's ability to engage public opinion in ways that mat-
ter. If large swaths of the public engage in constitutional dis-
course from an emotional perspective, the Court's reason-based 
interpretive methodology is unlikely to impact popular attitudes 
about constitutional law.392 This presents a critical challenge to 
those who see the Court as educating the public,393 as well as to 
those who envision the Court as engaged in active dialogue and 
negotiation with the American people.394 
It also suggests that there may be benefits to greater emotional 
transparency in judicial opinions. If the public speaks a language 
that responds to emotional content more strongly than analytical 
reasoning, the presence of emotional appeals in judicial decisions 
may enhance public support for the Court's actions. 
C. Constitutional Amendment 
Another area for inquiry is the continued normative effort to 
define the optimal level of constitutional tension between com-
mitment and imagination. Article V has taken its share of lumps 
from constitutional scholars for the difficulty it places on formally 
amending the Constitution through its supermajority require-
ments at both the proposal and ratification stages.395 At present, 
390. Edwards, supra note 253, at 211; FISKE supra note 233, at 225-31. 
391. Edwards, supra note 253, at 212; see also Haddock & Zanna, supra note 259, at 
337 (individuals whose attitudes were "affect-consistent" on other topics relied more on 
their emotional reactions to the topic in forming their attitudes). 
392. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 1030 (1992) (arguing that "if the Court is to communicate effectively 
with the people, it must somehow bring its interpretation of the Constitution to the level 
of the people"). 
393. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 208 (1952) (describing members of the Court as "teachers in a vital national se-
minar"). 
394. See Post, supra note 35, at 104 (describing the Court's decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas as an "opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects to hold with the Ameri-
can public"). 
395. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is ... Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 32, at 51, 51-53; LEVINSON, supra 
note 131, at 159-66. 
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Article V sets a threshold for amendment that is significantly 
higher than virtually any other constitution currently in exis-
tence.396 
If the intent behind the high threshold is to minimize the de-
structive impact of emotion on constitutional lawmaking-as the 
framers' theory of human behavior suggests-the underlying con-
cerns behind their intent seem increasingly misguided. In a world 
where reason and emotion coexist in decision making, where emo-
tion operates as a stabilizing force in constitutional culture, and 
where emotion carries with it important information about moral 
intuition and public values, there may be good reason to allow or-
dinary people greater access to the mechanisms for formal consti-
tutional change. If emotion can stabilize attitudes towards consti-
tutionally salient issues, a more permissive amendment process 
may be less unpredictable, unruly, and unreliable than the fra-
mers believed. 
D. Institutional Design 
Constitutional theorists have been actively searching for a set 
of conditions that would best facilitate sound public decision mak-
ing. These solutions have typically centered around mechanistic, 
deliberative structures, like Bruce Ackerman's proposal to set 
aside a "Deliberation Day" to enable higher-quality public partic-
ipation in political life.397 Emotion research has the potential to 
impact these solutions, suggesting that greater attention should 
be paid to the optimal emotional context for public decision mak-
ing or the cultivation of particular emotions when making deci-
sions, rather than a continued focus on increased deliberation and 
the cultivation of cognitive reasoning processes. 
For example, intolerance is tied to perceptions that members of 
a given group present a threat. When individuals hold strong in-
tolerant attitudes-attitudes deemed particularly dangerous to 
the future of heterogeneous democratic societies-those attitudes 
are more likely to shift under persuasive methods that provide 
emotional reassurance against the threat, rather than under the 
cognitive acquisition of facts suggesting that the target of the in-
396. LEVINSON, supra note 131, at 160. 
397. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3-4 (2004). 
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tolerant attitude does not present a realistic threat.398 If citizens 
view intolerance as damaging to constitutional systems, it may be 
wise to focus reform efforts on developing democratic institutions 
that provide this emotional reassurance rather than deliberative 
processes that implicitly denigrate emotion and idealize reasoned 
argument and logical inference. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional theory is behind. While theorists in economics, 
psychology, and biology use new realizations about human beha-
vior to challenge long-held theoretical assumptions,399 constitu-
tional theory has remained largely stagnant in its efforts to 
match theory to developing understandings of human behavior. 
The dominant view's continued prevalence within constitutional 
theory has obscured America's ability to see how emotion ad-
vances constitutional objectives, and America has failed to design 
institutions that could exploit emotion's positive effects and ad-
vance those objectives even further. 
Despite American's current failure, we can do better. The cen-
tral task for the next generation of constitutional theorists is to 
make constitutional theory relevant by aligning it with what we 
know about human and institutional behavior. This requires de-
veloping new areas of expertise, collaborating across disciplines, 
and letting go of broad generalizations about human behavior 
that have defined the course of constitutional theory for several 
generations of scholars. Theory--on either a descriptive or nor-
mative plane-must stay tied to practice to maintain its relev-
ance. As affective science begins to revolutionize the way we 
think about human behavior, it is incumbent upon constitutional 
theory to realign and respond. 
398. See Kuklinski et al., supra note 111, at 233--45; MARCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 
3. 
399. See DAMASIO, supra note 11, at xi-xii; ELSTER, supra note 50, at 1-2; Loewen-
stein, supra note 156, at 272, 276. 
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